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CHAPTER I 
THE THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF EMIL BRUNNER 
Introduction 
Ever since the reading ot Emil Brunner's The Divine-
Human Encounter this writer has felt the compulsion to delve 
more deeply into Brunner's position on the nature and percep-
tion or religious truth. 1 This little book, a revised pre-
sentation or the 1937 Olaus Petri Foundation lectures, is 
certainly one of the reasons that a man like David Cairns 
could say that as a theologian Brunner has had a far more 
pervasive influence than Barth. 2 Excerpts from this book, 
labeled by Dale Moody, "a turning point in the interpreta-
tion of truth,"3 and by Paul Tillich, "perhaps his moat 
suggestive book,"4 occur in a wide gamut of current theo-
lrt might be well to state at the outset that "religious 
truth" in thie study is understood as synonymous with Biblical 
or Christian truth. There is no attempt to denote the truth(e) 
of some vague religiosity by the use of this term. 
2
"The Theology or Emil Brunner," Scottish Journal 2f 
Theology, I (1948), 307. 
3"An Introduction to Emil Brunner," The Review and 
Expositor, XLIV (July, 1947), 326. 
4nsome Questions on Brunner's Epistemology," in lli 
Theology .2,!: !m!.! Brunner, edited by Charles W. Kegley 
(New Yorki Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 99. 
2 
logical writing. The problem of theological epistemology,5 
however, penetrates most ot Brunner•s major writings. Paul 
Jewett ~ays, "In the final analysis, the basic question is 
~ 
the epistemological one tfor Brunner]. How do we know?"6 
P. G. Schrotenboer concludes that Brunner•s theology is 
"largely a theological epistemology.»7 Because of Brunner•s 
vibrant interest in this subject, his lucid method or presen-
tation (in contrast to certain other contemporary European 
' theologians), and his often original and engaging thought 
in the a;ea of theological epistemology, thie writer has 
chosen his wz•itings for the major field of investigation 
for this study. 
A concurrent interest in the thought of contemporary 
Lutheran theologians in America has motivated the second, 
subsidiary field of investigation for this study. Three 
current American Lutheran theologians, Martin Heinecken, 
Taito Kantonen and Joseph Sittler, were chosen largely on 
the basis ot their contributions and influence in Lutheran 
theological circles in America today. Furthermore, each of 
5The term, "theological epistemology," is used in this 
study to refer to the primary God-man knovledge relationship, 
and not to the discipline of epistemology within the science 
of theology. 
6Em11 Brunner's Concept of Revelation (London: James 
Clarke-;iid Co., 1954), p. 1)9. 
7! ~Apologetics: ·· !!! Analysis §AS Appraisal .9i ~ 
Eristic Theology st Emil Brunner (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1955), 
p. 45. 
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them is interested, to varying degrees, in the epistemologi-
cal problem and its concomitant, the nature of religious 
truth. Heinecken, especially, makes frequent reference to 
these issues. These men, together with Brunner, all ask the 
same question: What is religious or Biblical truth, and hov 
can it be known by the individual? Can religious truth be 
"known" by ordinary rational measures, or is a unique epis-
temology operative when the subject matter is Biblical truth? 
This study will attempt to present the answer Brunner gives 
to this question and compare with his position the viewpoints 
or Heinecken, Kantonen and Sittler. 
A study of the various antitheses against which these 
men are plying their own theological epistemologies will 
shed light on the precise shape and direction they give to 
their thoughts in this area. Also, each man's position on 
revelation and on the relationship between reason and faith 
will, of necessity, be important corroborative areas of inves-
tigation. 
The major source materials for this study will include 
thirteen of the principal works of Emil Brunner and, with 
several minor exceptions, all of the vritin·gs in book or 
journal form by Heinecken~ Kantonen and Sittler. The study 
vill be found heavily documented, with frequent direct oita-
tions from the primary sources. 
tions will be carefully perused. 
It is hoped that these quota-
The aim or this study is to 
present Brunner•s position compared with that of the three 
Lutherans; the· quotations are an integral part ot this 
4 
presentation and are being supplied for didactic as well as 
documental purposes. 
Chapter I of the paper vill deal with Brunner and 
Chapter II with Heineoken, Kantonen and Sittler in comparison 
to Brunner. The concluding section will summarize Brunner•s 
position, evaluate the oompar:tson made between his positicn . 
and that of the three Lutherans, and raise several questions 
for further investigation in this field. 
The Historical Perspective 
The historical and theological phenomenon which, to the 
greatest extent, gives rise to the particular theological 
epistemology of Emil Brunner is an early begotten end long 
lasting doctrinaire intellectualism within the Church and 
its theology. A relationship had become an idea. Faith in 
God had given place to acceptance of doctrine. The Word who 
possesses man had been supplanted by a word which man possesses. 
The fides qua creditur had been displaced by the tides guae 
creditur. 
--
Brunner saves his heaviest arraignment in this respect 
for Orthodoxy, but he sees this misguided intellectualism as 
having made its entrance into theological circles as early as 
the second century. 
From the middle of the aecond century the Church haa 
instructed its believers that one "must believe" this 
and that doctrine in order to be a Christian--"whoever 
wishes to be saved must, above all things, embrace the 
Catholic faith." Once 1et ·dogma be the object or faith, 
and faith is then determined by means of the Object-
Subject Antithesis, by means or the rational concept 
5 
of truth, and remains thus~ even though the dogma is 
applied as revealed truth.~ 
Brunner sees the tv~ chief issues in the early Church--the 
doctrines of the Trinity and of the two natures of Christ--
as being a oase in point. These issues and the formulations 
they engendered were not an unfolding of the apostolic 
confession of faith, according to Brunner, but instead, an 
ontological oonstruotion which ~irected faith in another 
direction than did the Now Testament witness to Christ. 
Truth to be found in a relationship was being displaced 
by truth found in a positive dogma. 
According to Brunner, the second century Church, in her 
new interest and involvement in doctrinal formulation, did 
something which has, since then, always been disastrous in 
her history: 
she sought for certainties. She created for herself 
an instrument of differentiation, which she could use 
in a legalistic way; this instrument was the concept 
of the divinely inspired, and therefore "infallible" 
doctrine.9 
In her creeds as well, the early Church gave a dangerous 
direction to the living truth or the Word of God. 
8The Divine-Human Encounter, translated by Amandus W. 
Loos (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), P• 153. 
9Revelation !J!.S. Reason; The Christian Doctrine 52..!: Faith 
and Knowledge, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Preast c. 1946), P• 8. 
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As the Apostles' Creed by enumeration or a series of 
tacts to be believed caused pistis to degenerate into 
faith in facts, so by its failure to mention the act 
of reconciliation it favoured the wrong development 
of dogma along speculative linea.10 
The solidification of the early Church's oral tradition and 
rule of faith into the canonical Scriptures and the partic-
ular creeds would represent to Brunner a dangerous direction 
for religious truth. The truth becomes an object to be 
grasped and mastered, rather than a personal address to the 
individual. A living truth to be proclaimed becomes a tact 
to be believed. 
Unfortunately, the Greek intellectualism which so 
early dominated the ecclesiastical view of revelation 
obscured this truth from the very outset. The Church 
regarded preaching from the point of view of doctrine, 
instead of.!.!.£!. versa. Hence the proclamation of the 
Gospel--as was the case also with the revelation--
was regarded as the communication of doctrine, and 
thus as "applied doctrine," in which the personal 
address and the "Thou-form" were merely a matter of 
form.ll 
This exchange of the formulated confession, the "some-
thing true," for the living Word of God is a "blight which 
lies over the entire history of the Church. 1112 The Reforma-
tion period, limited to the sixteenth century, represented 
the one return within the history of the Church to the 
10Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine g!: ~ Church, 
Faith,~~ Consummation. Vol. III of Dogmatics, 
translated by David Cairns in collaboration with T. H. L. 
Parker (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), P• 231. 
llBrunner, Revelation~ Reason, P• 149, 
l2Brunner, In!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 119. 
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Biblical view ot faith and truth. 13 Brunner cannot speak 
highly enough of Luther, and throughout his writings he urges 
a return to a more "Lutheran" position in these matters. But 
the age of .Orthodoxy consequently lost the ground gained by 
the Reformers and lapsed once more into a rigid system ot 
guaranteed doctrines to be accepted. The period of Orthodoxy 
receives such a brunt of invective in the writings of Brunner 
that this period is treated separately and more fully elsewhere 
in this section. 
As Brunner sees it, the next great historical perversion 
in the area of religious truth and epistemology presented 
itself in Rationalism and the Enlightenment. Whereas previously 
the Church had tried to solve the problem of the irrational 
character of faith by a "mistaken heteronomy, 11 based, in the 
case of Roman Catholicism, on the guarantee for truth offered 
from the Vatican, or, in the case of Orthodoxy, on the guarantee 
of a doctrine of verbal inspiration, nov Rationalism attempted 
the solution by a "mistaken autonomy," a false dependence 
on the efforts of the human reason. 14 Rationalism denied 
that absolute divine truth could be found either in the 
Scriptures or the Church, saying that only the "eternal 
13 Emil Brunner, I!!!. Philosophy g.!: Religion .!!:2.m, 111!. 
Standpoint 2.f. Protestant Theology, translated by A. J. A. 
Farrer and Bertram Lee Woolf (Nev York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1937), p. 22. 
14Brunner, Revelation ~q Reason, P• 166. 
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truths of reason" are valid. 15 Here the content of religion 
can be ascertained independently of any historical phenomena. 
Revelation is simply the "last stage of an immanent recollec-
tion, an emergence into clear consciousness of what was always 
there. 1116 In agreement with Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum, the 
Rationalistic conception or truth was that of autonomous truth, 
"the identity of the Ego with itself', self-certainty in the 
sense of independence of everything which is not myselr.1117 
Idealism, with its theory that truth was "mind, reason, 
spirit, aubject,»18 attempted vainly to achieve a synthesis 
between Christianity and Rationalism and led instead, by way 
of react i on, into a naturalistic materialism. 
In the earlier period or the Enlightenment the attempt 
was made to represent the Biblical revelation as that 
which is essentially rational; in the real _period of 
rationalism, on the contrary, revelation no longer had 
any meaning; reason was all. Romantic Idealism made a 
great effort to deepen the concept of reason to such an 
extent that it might include within the historical reve-
lation. But the realistic-naturalistic reaction against 
Idealism caused this supposed synthesis of Christianity 
and rational philosophy, great as it was an intellectual 
achievement, to break down; theology confronted--
nothing ?19 
l5Brunner, Philosophy 2! Religion, p. 36. 
16 lll!!•, p. 39. 
17Emil Brunner, I,h!!. ~ and the Horld (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p.°"6s. 
18Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation. First 
.f!.!:1: !2.Bndations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), 
P• 33. 
19Brunner, Revelation !.ru! Reason, p. 11. 
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In this shift from an idealistic subjectivism to a barren 
materialism Brunner sees the main epiotemological problem 
for tode.y. 
modern spiri·tual evolution has bee-n taking unam-
biguously the line or a more or less materialistic 
objectiviam •••. In · the sphere or materia·l being 
the quantum is the only differentiating factor. 
Material being is merely quantitative being. An 
objectivist understanding of truth expresses itself, 
therefore, not meroly in terms of practical materialism~ 
but also in a general quantification of all life •••• ~o 
According to Brunner, each of these systems--whether 
heteronomous Orthodoxy or autonomous Rationalism or · subjec-
. . 
tivistic 1 Idealism or objectivistic Materialism--have as a 
\ 
common malady the subject-object antithesis. Either the 
emphasis is placed to a mistaken extreme degree on the 
object in the faith-knowledge rel~tionship as in Orthodoxy 
or Materialism, or on the subject as in Rationalism and 
Ideali~m. Brunner says it was left for the newest form or 
philosophy, the existent i al, to question the validity of 
the antithesis itselr. 21 In 1947 he said: 
Within the last generation we have seen springing up 
more or less spontaneously in different areas, and 
moving on parallel lines, a series or attempts to 
tackle the problem of truth in a new fashion, namely 
in such a way that the old opposition of objectivism 
and subjectivism no longer plays the dominating 
roles.22 
20 l Christianity gng, Civilisation. First Part, P• 3 • 
21 The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 82. 
---
22
christianity· and Civilisati211. First Part, P• 34. 
10 
Finding his basis in Martin Luther and in Soren 
Kierkegaard (whom Brunner calls "the greatest Christian 
thinker of modern timesn 23), and profiting from the personal-
istio theologi9s of Ferdinand Ebner and Martin· Buber, 24 
Brunner spends a great deal of effort in many of his writings 
presenting his own version of theological epistemology. More 
vill be said of t~is below. But first, Brunner•s chief 
"whipping boy" and the subject of his most frequent disparage-
ment, Orthodoxy, must be investigated. 
Emil Brunner•s position on theological epistemology can 
boat be understood in the light of the antitheses which he 
opposes in this connoction. The antithesis most often attacked 
is that of Protestant Orthodoxy with its narrow, impersonal 
objectivism and biblicism. 
In the centuries immediately following the Reformation, 
the recovered Scriptural insights into the personalistic 
nature of faith and revelation all but vanished, says 
Brunner. 
Whilst the Reformation in its centre vas the redis-
covery of the non-intellectualiet conception of faith, 
this new discovery vas lost all too soon in the fight 
against the Roman heresy. The Reformation Churches 
became orthodox.25 
23 Moody, .2.Ja• cit., P• JlJ. 
24Paul King Jewett, "Ebnerian Personalism and its 
Influence upon Brunner's Theology," Ih§. Westm1.nster Theological 
Review, XIV (May, 1952), 133-34. 
25Emil Brunner, Christianitx and Civilisation. ~econd 
Part: SEeoitic Problems (New York: Charles Scri~ner•s Sons, 
1949), P• 49. 
ll 
As oharacterietice of the period of Orthodoxy Brunner 
would include an eprioristio and legalistic view as to the 
inspired and infallible nature of the Bible, an attempt at 
providing man-made securities for an otherwise faith~based 
relation to God, and a displacement of a living interest in 
the personal and ethical by an insistence on the precise and 
dogmatic. 
Jewett notes that Brunn~r's all but universal procedure 
is "to trace the curse of Orthodoxy back to one fountainhead, 
a belief in the verbal inspiration of the Scripture •• • • n26 
Apparently without valid internal or external warrant, the 
Orthodox fathers had foisted onto the Bible a false and mis-
leading qualification, accord1ng to Brunner. 
In orthodox Protestantism an (aprioristic) faith in 
the Bible corresponds to this faith in dogma. The 
Biblical concept or faith which the Reformers had 
rediscovered was replaced by an equally formal 
authority, namely the authority of the Holy Book 
whose divine inspiration has to be believed "from 
the first."27 
In so doing, according to Brunner, Orthodoxy bad made of the 
Bible's "living present voice cf God" an "independent divine 
thing, which just as such, as a corpu~ mortuum, is stamped 
with divine authority."28 This imposition of an infallible 
standard onto Scripture has inevitably resulted in a double 
I 
concept of faith: faith in the first · place in the Bible's 
26lm!l, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p. 118. 
27Brunner, I.rut Christian Doctrine g! iru!. Church, P• 189. 
2S!LQ.!:g, and !h.!, World, P• 92. 
I 
12 
Christ, and secondly, faith in the Bible as the inerrant 
Word of God. Brunner calls the !.2!!!, scriptura principle 
an indefensible supplement to the §ql~ ,l.!9..!. principle and a 
stipulation added by post-Reformation theology.29 He says 
that this principle, together with an attempted equation of 
the Word of God with the word or the Bible, is a product ot 
the views of late Judaism. 30 In thus regarding Scripture as 
true in itself and as revelation in itself, Orthodoxy has 
changed its meaning from "an address made by an act of God" 
to a universal truth having the force of law. 31 Orthodoxy 
has changed a paradoxical and indirect unity between the 
word of the Spirit and the word or the Scriptures into a 
32 
causal and d1rect one, an unapiritual one. Thus the 
materiel principle of Orthodoxy is ultimately a denial of 
its formal principle. 
For Orthodox faith justification is something to 
bal!ave, a truth pronounced by God Himself, a judicial 
sentence which at once ~bsolves me ~nd imparts to me 
the righteousness of Christ, a correct transaction 
before God's court or juetice.33 · 
The attempt to convert the historical revelation into a 
timeless system of truth has resulted in a dooetic approach 
·
29The, Christi!in, Doctrine .Q..f. 1h!. Church, P• 238. 
30Ravelation ~ Reason, p. 127. 
31.'.l:.b!. Philosophy ,g,! Religion, P• 34. 
32
~., pp. 33-34. 
33Brunner, Ih.!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 155. 
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to Scripture, 34 an approach where men attempt to "have" the 
Word or God.35 
Brunner sees as one of the principal instigations toward 
this kind of an objectivistic, legalistic view of God's truth 
man's inherent struggle for indigenous securities and 
assurances. He writes: 
In the controversy against the Catholic principle of 
tradition on the one side, and on the other the 
principle of the Spirit of the individualistic 
enthusiast together with the newly arising rational-
istic principle, the temptation could not be with-
stood to create a system ot assurance including the 
confessional dogma, the notion or verbal inspiration, 6 and the Bible understood as a book of revealed doctrine.3 
At another place he says: 
for the second time in her history the Church, in her 
anxiety to establish security, took a wrong turning • 
• • • they returned to the Catholic idea of revelation, 
according to which the revelation guaranteed the infall-
ible doctrine contained in Scripture, and the Scripture 
guaranteed the divine revelation •••• 37 
In this respect Orthodoxy stood together with even the 
most extreme subject1vistic of all systems, mysticism • 
n 
• • 
• in both man wants to be the master of truth, he 
wants to possess it.n38 Brunner insists that religious 
truth cannot be "possessed" by man; man can never be its 
master. Man can never "get God in a box." Religious truth 
34.!h1g,., pp. 172, 174. 
35rbid., p. 31. 
36Ibid., PP• 31-32. 
37Revelation end Reason, p. 10. 
38Brunner, Word and~ World, P• 76. 
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can only be "known" in the exiatential Divine-human encounter. 
God is never to be subjected to a guaranteed system, but is 
always Subject • 
. Schrotenboer says ·that Brunner's chief complaint against 
Orthodoxy is that it is blind to the "dimensional distinction.n39 
That is, it treats .1.n the subject-object dimension vhat belongs 
in the personal dimension. Brunner himself writes.s· 
' The significant factor in Orthodoxy i~ that personal 
correspondence was crowded out by a conception ot 
truth orientated about the Object-Subject antithesis. 
Orthodoxy thought or God as the teacher who delivered 
supernatural, revealed truth and proffered faith to 
man~ In this way the Word of God was identified with 
doctrine, and faith was assent to this doctrine. Pre-
cisely that which ia the concern of Biblical faith was 
consequently no longer understood: that is, overcoming 
the Object-Subject relation and h!~ing the real Person 
of God present in ·His Word •••• 
More will be said below regarding the subject-object anti-
thesis and Brunner's suggested personalistic, relational 
answer to it. Suffice it to say here thet Brunner sees 
Orthodoxy as having forfeited the entire personalistic emphasis 
of the Reformers for the sake or a more rationalistic, doctrinal 
approach. 
The ethics-minded Brunner furthermore observes a close 
relationship between extreme involvement with precision and 
flawlessness in doctrinal formulation and a neglect of the 
sanctified life and ethics. "How often does a perfectly 
39.QJ?.. 911., p. 42 
401'..b!L Divine-Human Encounter, PP• 102-03. 
15 
faultless orthodoxy go with a moral sterility," he warns.41 
Interest in doctrine more and more arrogates to itself 
every other interest; the urge for an ever-nicer preci-
sion in the formulation of conceptions--the absence of 
which in the whole Bible is so characteristic--becomes 
dominant in Church life and leads to endless, even more 
subtle, doctrinal controversies. Christian love, prac-
tical discipleship atrophies. Once let faith and 
recognition of a system of revealed doctrines become 
identical, a nd Christian piety, described in the Bible 
as «faith which proves ~ffioaci~us in love," is aeen i~ 
contra-distinction to doctrine in the clearest and most 
definite way. Caiechetic~l instruction becomes the 
preferred and practically the sole means of educating 
the younger generation to become Christians. The 
thoroughly trained theologian becomes the pattern around 
which the fellowship is supposed to orientate itself as 
regards the meaning of being a Christian.42 
These are the fruits of Protestant Orthodoxy according 
to Brunner, fruits which still hamper and even threaten the 
life of faith in the Church today. But these over-emphases 
on intellectualism and objectivism, these tendencies toward 
the concept rather than the act or the relation, are only 
part of a much broader problem--the radical difference between 
the Greek and the Biblical concepts of truth and knowledge. 
Greek versus Biblical Concepts of Knowledge 
It would not be inaccurate to say that Emil Brunner 
centers his theological epistemology in the antithesis found 
between Greek and Biblical concepts of knowledge. Greek 
thought and meaning is characterized by an immanent, rational, 
41The Theology g,! Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1931), P• 69. 
42Brunner, Ih!!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 32. 
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abstract principle while Biblical is tranecendant, revelatory 
and personalistio. 43 While Greek knowledge is designated by 
the general or universal, the timeless and the impersonal, 
Brunner says Christian knowledge is just the opposite: 
particularistic, historical and. personal.44 Greek philo-
sophical thought is built up around the concept; Biblical 
around the story or the event. B·runner writes: 
The Church has had to pay ~early for the fact that it 
substituted the Christian oatechism for the Biblical 
histor1, and that it permitted the Greek concept of 
knowledge and of truth to take such a dominant place 
in its theology. The revelat1on of God must be told, 
not taught; the doctrine only has validity as a means 
of serving the "telling" of the Good News. Where 
narrative is replaced by doctrine, Greek thought triumphs 
over the thought of the Bible.45 
To present this antithesis in as bold a relief as possi-
ble this section will be arranged in antithetical form: the 
Greek over against the Biblical. Whereas Greek thought is 
known by logic and consistency, by the system, Biblical 
thought is seen to be paradoxical and a-rational. The Greek 
tradition centers in the idea and abstraction, in reasoning, 
while the Biblical tradition has its basis in the concrete 
event, · in the historical, in the encounter. Greek knowledge 
is substantialistic; it is interested in the "it," in the 
thing. Biblical knowledge is p~rsonalistic; it is interested 
in the "Thou," in the person. While Greek thought emphasizes 
43Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation. First .13.!:!, P• 65. 
44~ a.wi ~ World, p. 18. 
45Revelation and Reason, p. 201. (The emphases in this 
quotation, as well~ all other emphases in this study, are 
those of the author being quoted.) 
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continuity and immanence, Biblical knowledge manifests discon-
tinuity end separation. In Greek thought man is the disposer, 
the autonomy and security seeker; in Biblical thought God is 
the Disposer, and in H~m alone is security found. 
Paradox is one of the distinguishing features of Biblical 
thought according to Brunner: 
The Christian Church has knovn from the very first 
that what she believes is a stumbling-block and fool-
ishness from the point of view of rational thought. 
The object of faith is something which is absurd to 
reason, i.e., par~dox; the hall-mark of logical 
inconsistency clings to all genuine pronouncements 
of faith.46 
\ . 
There can be no knowledge of God but paradoxical knowledge, 
says Brunner.47 "· •• the assertions of faith are one and 
all paradoxes. 1148 Jewett understands Brunner' s use of the 
term "paradox" as having a largely symbolic meaning: 
the paradoxical form of words whereby faith expresses 
itself constitutes a pointer (Hinweis). The paradoxes 
will, 11 by means of conceptual representation, point 
to something which lies outside the realm of the con-
ceptual. n49 
Related to the above thought, Brunner speaks of a "poetic" 
quality inherent in religious language and thought. 50 The 
paradox has a fluidity which, like poetry, suggests a variety 
of meenings, and a framework of multiple levels of truth. 
46!.h~ Philosophy of Religion, p. 55. 
47Jbid., p. 95. 48.!lli., p. 96. 
49~ Brunner•s Concept of Revelation, p. 109. 
50Ill.!. Christian Doctr~.ne .21: Q.gg,, Vol. I of Dogmatics, 
translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1950), p. 62. 
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To Brunner, like Soren Kierkegaard, the paradox, with all 
its contrasts to the sharp and hard edges of academic 
theological definition and the neatly hewn and faultlessly 
fitted arguments or the theological system, is the language 
and the epistemological structure of faith-knowledge. 
Brunner claims that the whole endeavor of the reason to 
unite everything in an all-inclusive system, even if this 
system is effected by means of antitheses which are tolerated 
for the sake of a synthesis, is futile. 51 
Revelation cannot be summed up in a system, not evon 
in a dialectical one. A system always implies that 
the reason has forced ideas into a certain mould: it 
is the "imperialism" of an idea, even when th i s idea 
claims to be "Biblica1.n52 
Theological deliberation is not meant to be solidified and 
finalized by locking it once and for all into a compact, 
unified system. Theological thought has one purpose: to 
be referent to truth existing in another dimension. 
The soundness of theological doctrine and ideas 
depends upon their direction, upon the single-
mindedness with which they point to Him. There 
is no closed theological system ••• • 53 
Theological formulation, therefore, is not to be an object 
of faith, but an index, a director toward an encounter with 
God, where faith first becomes possible. 
5llh!. Mediator; A Study of !h!. Central Doctrine .2.! !h!. 
Christian Faith, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, c. 1947), P• 107. 
52!h!., Christian Doctrine 2f. God, p. 72. 
53Brunner, Revelation and ~!.Q.!l, P• 157. 
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Greek speculative thought seeks after the abstract, the 
static and the conceptual; Biblical thought is immersed in 
the historical and in the truth which happens. 
An idea can be detached from its original source. 
It is timeless, universally and always true. Christian 
faith on the other hand ia concerned with the truth 
which we perceive as true for us, not in itself, in 
virtue of the bare idea, but only because God actually 
utters it: we are concerned with revelation where 
everything depends on its having happened.54 
Brunner sees as a key to Scriptural truth the passage from 
the Gospel according to St. John, "But grace and truth came 
by Jesus Christ." 55 Truth came into being; it happened. 
God did it. This is diametrically opposed to the Greek notion 
that truth is thnt which is timeless, changeless, and subject 
to the eterna1. 56 
The truth or which the Bible speaks is always a 
happening, and indeed the happening of the meeting 
between God and man, an act of God which must be 
received by an act of man. The truth acting--this 
is the characteristic unphilosophical, non-Greek way 
in which the Bible speaks or truth.57 
The above quotation presents the very center of Brunner's 
position on the nature of religious truth: truth is 
round only in the concrete happening (the existential 
54Brunner, The Philosophy .2.!: Religion, pp. 152-53. 
55 John 1:17. 
56 Brunner, Ih.!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 140. 
57 
Ibid., pp. 201-02. 
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encounter58); it is a personal meeting between the God who 
reveals Himself and man who responds with personal decision; 
it is characteristically non-Greek in essence. 
Brunner further notes: 
Biblical "truth" is as different from what otherwise 
is called truth as this personal encounter and the 
double-aided self-giving and its resulting fellow-
ship are different from the comprehension of facts 
by means of reaaoning.59 
It is the difference between kennen and wiesen: they are 
knouledge in two different dimensions. One is dynamic and 
aotualistic; the verb is its chief word. The other is 
substantialietic and impersonal; it centers around the noun. 
One is built upon a relation between subject and subject; 
the other is baaed on the subject-object split. One is 
achieved only in personal decision; the other is attained 
via the intellectualiatic nod. Brunner calls it "the pre-
judice of modern man" that he so naively presupposes that 
there is only one kind of truth, that is, the objective, 
impersonal truth which can be proved. This presupposition 
excludes from him all truth which 11 cannot and ought not to 
be proved, because it hss to be appropriated in personal 
58The term "existential" is used throughout in this 
study simply to denote the intense inner awareness of a 
man existing coram ~. There is no attempt to denote 
any of the precise philosophical or literary forms which 
the existentialist approach has engendered within the past 
years. 
59Ibid., p. 75. 
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deciaion."60 
While more will be said below concerning Brunner•s 
personalism, it should be noted here that he considers 
every moving away from the personal "I-Thoun dimension to 
the impersonal "I-It" dimension as a move away from God's 
truth to the truth or the world. "Abstraction is seculari-
zation," says Brunner.61 
The distinction between world-knowledge and God-
knowledge--leaving to scientific investigation the 
world of facts and reserving for divine revelation 
the disclosure of the mystery of God's being, will 
and purpose--is not the only revolution which the 
Christian faith produces within the concept of truth. 
There is a second, just as important. What kind of truth 
is it, then, which is revealed to faith? It is not truth 
in the sense ot knowing something, but in the sense of a 
divine-human, personal encounter. God does not reveal 
this and that; He does not reveal a number of truths. 
He reveals Himself by communicating Himselt.62 
Theology's main concern, then, as over against science 
and philosophy, is for a truth which is not an "It," a state 
of affairs or a situation. It seeks a truth which cannot be 
known in cool detachment, but only in "the obedience and 
confidence of faith."6 3 
The Christian Faith itself is wholly directed towards 
Truth; but who would care to maintain that the true 
knowledge of faith is scientific knowledge! Science 
leads to truth of a quite different kind; the truth 
60word and !!l.!. World, p. 62. 
61Revelation .!Jl5! Reason, p. 411. 
62arunner, Christianity .!!!J!, Civilisation. First Part, 
p. 37. 
63Brunner, The Christian Doctrine .2.!: God, P• 63. 
of faith is of a wholly different order •••• The 
truth of faith, in the sense in which the Bible uses 
the term, is "truth as encounter," truth in the dimen-
sion of the person, "Thou-I," but not in the "thing"-
dimension. The truth which faith perceives and grasps 
is a personal self-disclosure, the truth of revelation, 
not the truth which can be discovered by research and 
the use of the intellect.64 
The difference between Biblical and worldly knowledge, 
Brunner would say, is the difference between knowing a person 
and knowing a fact. One 1nvolves sharing, communion, deci-
sion; the other stops with intellectual acquaintance and 
acceptance. They are in contradistinot realms. 
Greek thought presents a continuum between the human 
and the divine. Although the one is far above the ·other, 
still the analogia ent!§. holds true. The Greek and the 
modern mind are united in this respect, says Brunner: the 
Greek mind makes nature the Absolute, and the modern mind 
makes the mind or men, history, and the dynamic element the 
Absolute. Botb of them assume, however, a natural means or 
rapprochement between man and the Absolute. 65 "The rational 
man assumes a closed universe, as it were, an unbroken 
continuum of truth •••• n66 Man by his rational faculties 
can achieve divine knowledge. There is a bridge, and that 
bridge is the reason, the intellect. The real is as man 
can conceive or it; there is natural, however difficult to 
64 !bid., p. 61. 
65Brunner, Mediator, p. 116. 
66Brunner, The Theology ,2! Crisis, P• 15. 
23 
achieve, access to the divine. Man c.an ultimately base his 
confidence in himself. 
Another vay to express this Greek idea of continuity 
in theology ia to speak . of an "imtnanenoe theology." Here 
man finds God in the depth of neture and of his own soul. 
Here there is an unbroken unity between God and the natural 
existence of man. 67 
religion of immediacy, be it of the mystical or the 
rationalistic or the idealistic type, means that the 
necessary presuppositions enabling us to establish the 
right relation to God, or to re~ove the obstacle 
between ou~
8
present and the normal co~dition, lie i~ 
ourselves.b . 
Brunner claims that the farther this "process of refraction 
of immediacy" goes, the more impersonal and secular knowledge 
and truth beoome. 69 The more continuity and directness are 
emphasized the more coldl:Y objeoti ve and remote does k'nov-
ledge become. "An impersonal God and an impersonal man are 
the necessary and inevitable oonseq~ences of a religion of 
1mmanenoe."70 There is no encounter. There is no communi-
cation with an Other. 
But this autonomo~s self-confidence besed on the convic-
tion that man is continuous ~1th God and that God can be 
known directly and immediately is s~attered, says Brunner, 
67;tbid., p. 29. 
~8Emil . Brunner, The Scandal .2£. Christianity (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1951), p. 22. 
69!.b.!. Christian Doctrine .2!:, ·.9..Qs, P• 62. 
70Brunner, Ib.!. Theology .Q.!: Crisis, P• Jl. 
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folloving an insight or Kierkegaard, by the claim of revela-
tion. "Thus the stumbling-block or revelation is this: it 
denies that divine truth is a continuation of human thought. 
• • • 
1171 God and God alone causes Himself to be known. There 
is no valid knowledge of Him apart from His revelation. The 
God or immediacy is never the true God-over-me. "A thought-of 
God is never Lord. 1172 More will be said below concerning a 
natural knowledge of God; here it is enough to say that 
Christianity is based, according to Brunner, on a clear 
discontinuity and separation between God and the intellect 
of man. 
The Greek tradition cannot tolerate a religion that 
denies man security within himself. It cannot allo~ a reli-
gion which throws man totally upon God for his existence. 
In fact, Brunner would say that 0 all rel1g1onn is a "lQ8t 
and highe at attempt or m.an to find his own security. 1173 
Always end everywhere the same tendency to seek 
security rises out of man's sinful, anxious nature 
and therefore expresses itself wherever men havo 
the Churoh.74 
Brunner sees man's struggles for security, whether they be 
by vay of theological systems or guaranteed dogmatic formu-
lations or an infallible book, as man's basic sin: man wants 
71 Medietor, p. 108. 
72jord gnd the World, P• 25. 
73.lli Christian Do·ctrine ·.Q! !!l.!, Church, p, 206. 
74The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 26. 
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to be autonomous. He wants to have his ovn assurances, and 
these within his own management. And man's basic fault is 
also the basic fault of the Church, says Brunner: 
It tthe ChurchJ would like to hold some aesuranoes 
in its hend--who could not understand that? It would 
like to have in its power or die'posal that in which 
lies its stability and its very life. It would like 
to ba certain of God in a mor.e direct way than is 
guaranteed through . the promise as given to faith 
and in prayer.75 
Brunne~ sees it as a tttendency of man's spirit and will" 
to get truth fnto his power, to try to manipulate it like an 
object at hiA disposal. Thia same tendency drives man to 
try to make the Word of God a disposable object, to seize 
the authority or the free divine Word and make it available 
in an accleaiaetical system of authority. 76 
Knowing, thinking, possessing something is thus, first 
of all, something over which I have disposal •••• 
But if the Word of God meets me in faith, this is all 
reversed. Then I do not have something like · property 
which ia at my disposal, but I myself become property; 
then I myself become disposable.77 
Whereas natural acquisition of knowledge makes man master over 
that vhich he knows and superior to each object of his knowledge, 
in revelation the opposite is the case. "God, through His 
revelation, becomes Lord over me; He makes me His 
property. 1178 
75~.' p. 25. 
76IJaid., p. 24. 
77~., pp. 87-88. 
78Revelation nnd Reason, P• 26. 
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The empirical, disposable type of knowledge furthermore 
leaves the knower untouched morally; it only adds to his 
sinful autonomy. 
When I perceive "something," this "something" is then 
within me; it becomes, so to say, my possession. I 
embrace it. In knowing it, I dispose or it. That 
which is perceived, that which is known, is at my dis-
posal. The other side of this process is that I myself 
am not actually affected by it. My knowledge certainly 
enriches me; it may also have influence in my decisions, 
on my way of thinking; but it never penetrates to the 
core of my person--it does not transform "myself." I 
am, after all, the one embracing; I am the possessor.79 
This, then, is the sharp antithesis which Brunner sees 
between the Greek intellectualist tendency of natural man 
and the Biblical obedience-in-trust stance of the man of 
faith. The antithesis is sharp and it is clear. It is the 
decisive element whereby the Christian faith is distinguished 
from all other religions and philosophical systems. 
The Subject-Object Split and Beyond 
The "Object-Subject Antithesis" is Brunner•s most often 
used designation for that kind or epistemology which is in 
direct contrast to the Biblical. The antithesis between 
object and subject, between the objective truth and the 
subjective acceptance or truth, is the basis for an epis-
temology which has dominated all Western philosophy since 
its beginning. 
?9The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 87. 
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Being and thinking, truth and knowledge--this is 
the problem around which philosophical thought has 
turned at least since the Sophists and Socrates--
a problem that emerges again in Kant's question 
about the relation between the "thing-in-itself" 
and experience.SO 
The subjective knower cooly and with disinterest "h~ndles" 
a set of facts. The 11 I" passes objective judgment on the 
11 it." The tr~th is this and that, a something to be observed, 
a quantity to be counted, a datum to be disposed of. Modern 
man, according to Brunner, is "possessed by the idea of 
object-truth, thing credulous man, who cannot but think in 
terms of quantity, whose eyes are blind to all that belongs 
to the sphere of quality.n81 
In this "new knowledge," an integral part of Western 
thought, but brought to the fore even in theology by modern 
philosophy, the rationalization of science, and modern eco-
nomic and social life, what in the Bible is meant as expres-
sion of faith has come to be understood as the object of 
faith. 
The Bible speaks about faith being the same as being 
in reality allied to Christ; the misunderstanding 
replaces the real alliance by the alliance with 
Christ as object of faith, as a truth to be 
believed.82 
This replacement of the personal understanding of faith by 
the intellectual is "probably the most fatal occurrence 
within the entire history of the Church," says Brunner. 83 
80Brunner, ..!h.!s•, PP• 81-82. 
8lchristianity !!!.!! Civilisation. First !!.!:1, p. 37. 
82The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 154. 83.!l!!g., P• 154. 
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A living relation to a Person has been displaced by an uncon-
cerned acceptance or rejection of a fact. The subject stands 
removed from the object; the subject 1s in control; the subject 
is untouched in his inner being. This is the difference betveen 
the general, secular epistemology and the Biblical. In the one, 
religious truth is an object of man's knovledge; it is part of 
his rational world, of vhich he is the center. 84 In the other 
man is confronted by a Person, another Subject, a Thou; truth 
is experienced, and only in the personal relationship. Accord-
ing to Brunner, "The Biblical understanding of truth cannot be 
grasped through the Object-Subject antithesis: on the contrary 
it is falsified through it.n85 There lies an abyss between the 
personal subject-Subject relation of faith and the subject-
object antithesis of Western thought. There is no continuity 
between these two epistemologies; they exist in different 
dimensions. 
Brunner sees a hyper-ccncern for doctrine and theological 
instruction as one of the most evident symptoms of this subject-
object antithesis vithin the Church. 
the Word alone is efficacious, but doctrine is not--
not even Biblical or cateohetical doctrine. When we 
consider the Biblical understanding of proclamation, 
we observe that it means an event entirely personal, 
in the nature of a personal meeting, which is far 
different from the catechetical homiletical traffic 
8.3 Ibid.,· P• 154. 
84Revelation !J!.4 Reason, P• .366. 
85The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 21. 
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in dogma which is determined by the Greek concept of 
truth.86 
Although Brunner himself has written a three-volume dogmatics, 
he says this about doctrine: 
In doctrine man speaks no ionger in the "Thou"-form 
to God--as in the original confession of faith--but 
he now speaks about God as "He." Doctrine is no longer 
a spontaneous, personal response, in the for.m or 
prayer, to the Word or God, but already, even in its 
simplest form, it is reflective speech about God. 
The process of leaving the sphere or personal encounter 
in order to enter into t~e impersonal ~phere of reflec-
tion is the presupposition or all doctrine. God is now 
no longer the One who speaks, but the One who is spoken 
about.87 · 
Brunner considers the true and primary purpose of doctrine 
to be the expression or confession of faith, not the object 
of faith. 88 Doctrine is to contain a "minimum of reflection,n89 
and is to serve the positive purpose of apologetics. It is 
to be the nsituation" in and through which the personal 
encounter with God can take place. 
Doctrine standing by itself, separated from the Word of 
God as ·the event of encounter, is seen by Brunner as the 
essence of legalism. 
Whatever the content of this doctrine may be--it may be 
even the doctrine of atonement through Jesus Christ and 
of justifying faith--so long as it is not God Himself 
who speaks with man and while speaking meets him in 
fellowship, so long as doctrine confronts him as some-
86 Ibid., p. 176. 
87The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 38. 
88Revelation and Reason, P• 156. 
891h.,! Christian Doctrine of Gqd, P• 39. 
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thing taught by the Church or Bible "which one must 
believe if he wants to be e Christi-an," his relation 
to it remains legal and beers ell the marks of Legalism, 
Even Jesus and the grace of God is then law--gemma, the · 
letter.90 
Church dogmatism is thus the natural man's legalistic and 
ego-directed attempt to avoid the risk of the authentic 
obedience-in-trust relation to God. Where faith or truth 
. . 
is understood es an acceptance of doctrines instead of e 
Divine-human encounter, says Brunner, self-centered legalism 
is the controlling f~ctor.91 
There have always been two tendencies competing with 
one another throughout the entire history of the Church: 
subjectivism and objeotivism. 92 Subjectivism, that urge for 
freedom and spontaneity, that w~ll to attain the highest 
possible ~evel of self-realization,93 showed itself already 
in the primitive Church, and then throughout the entire 
course of church history, particularly since the sixteenth 
century. The negation of objective doctrine and form; the 
emphasis on conscious states or experience; the ultimate 
criterion for the true and the right seen in individual 
feeling and appreheneion--all of these subjective tendencies 
threatened to undermine the Church at its very foundations, 
says B!unner~ To defend itself against . this subjectivity, 
and in reaction to it, the early Church and the Church of 
90Th~ Divine-Human Encounter, p. 118. 
9lchristian!tY and Civilisation. First ru1, pp. 42-43. 
92~ Divine-Human Encounter, p. 21. 93Ibid _., p. 26. 
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post-Reformation times built up a system of assurances made 
up of objective doctrines. The timeless, the external, the 
detached, the impersonal, the abstract: these were and are 
oharacteriatics ' or this objectivism in the Church. or the 
two, Brunner sees objectivism as the greeter hazard: 
Objeotivism has always been the real ecclesiastical 
danger witpin the Church--through all centuries and 
even now. · From within the Church its danger is much 
more difficult to recognize, and the struggle against 
it vas always the most dangerous. For the opponent 
will feel himself attacked in his most sacred precinct 
and will consider h j mselt called to be guardian on 
the battlefield of tho holy treasure entrusted by God 
to the Church.94 
True religious knowledge end truth is to be found in 
neither subjectivism or objectivism, says Brunner. Both of 
the m present only half-truths. Furthermore, a higher synthe-
sis of these two poles will not arrive at truth either: 
There is no right middle way between Objectivism and 
Subjectivism: there is no correct mean between two 
errors. In this instance too the truth is more 
parcdoxical and harder to find.95 
Both subjectivism and objectivism are based on the Greek 
tradition: the subject-object •split. The truth, however, 
is not to be found in either subject alone or object alone 
according to Brunner. 
since neither the subject nor the object is the 
ultimate truth, it is inevitable that man's mind 
shifts from one pole to the other in an incessant 
9 .3 Ib i a • , p • 2 6 • 
94.Illl.g_., .pp. 170-71. 
95 .!ill· , p. 40. 
I • 
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pendulum movement. It cannot rest quietly with 
either or the alternatives, since neither of them 
carries real conviction. This vee~ing from objec-
tivism into subjectivism and back is unavoidable, 
because in the long run neither of these two answers · 
to the question of truth is credible.96 
Ultimate truth is thus · not found in the "either/or of' objec-
. 97 
tivism and subjectivism." Whether the knowing subject 
posits itself es the truth, or whether it posits as truth 
its known object--in neither ~see will truth be revealed. 
"Thus truth is not to be found either in the object or in. 
the subject, but beyond both. · Truth, then, is God Himself 
in His self-communication to man. 1198 The subje~t-object split, 
the antithesis between knowledge of "something truthful" and 
the truth itself, must give way to truth found in a "purely 
personal meeting between the accosting God and the answering 
man."99 Religious truth is personal. Knowledge of religious 
truth is not found in a one-sided subjectivism or objectivism; 
it is found in relation with the personal God who discloses 
Himself to the total person of man. Accordi.ng to Sohrotenboer, 
the best word to doscribe the gulf which exists between subject-
object "it" truth and personal "Thou" truth is the term 
100 
"incommensurability." These two types of truth are as 
different as ·"the truth which I possess" and "the Truth 
96C}')ristianit:y and Civilisation;. First !!.ll, P• 39. 
97 · ;{bid • , p. 3 8 • 98 ilig., p. 35. 
99
~ Divine-Human Encounter, P• 89. loo.QR..~., p. 43. 
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which possesses me."lOl Within the field of human thought in 
general, Brunner says, "The discovery of the 'I-Thou' truth 
in philosophy by Ebner and Buber is indeed, as Heim has put 
it, a 'Copernican turning~point' in the history or thought.nl02 
"In the beginning is relation" ia the byword of' Martin Buber. 103 
"Truth as encounter" is Brunner's version of the same thought. 104 
Not that knowing which gives man "something," which enriches 
his intellect or adds to hie knowledge, but which leaves him 
basically unaltered, but that knowing which changes man in 
the very core of his person, 105 which transforms rather than 
educates, which creates fellowship between God and man--thie 
is the Biblical concept of truth. 
Personalisrn as the Key 
The theology of Emil Brunner might appropriately be 
called a personalistic theology. 106 In order to appreciate 
the implications of this statement, a brief look at personal-
lOlBrunner, Christianity and Civilisation. First 1!!.!:1, 
p. , .. o. 
l021h.!! Christian Doctrine g.!: Creation and Redemption, 
translated by Olive Wyon. Vol. II of Dogmatics (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Preas, 1952), P• v. 
l03Martin Buber, ·1 fill!! !h..2..Y,, translated by Ronald 
Gregor Smith (Second edition; New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1958), p. 18. 
104.I..!l!! Divine-Human Encounter, P• 7. 
l05arunner, Ibiq., p. 88. 
106schrotenboer, ~· .£.!i., P• 203. 
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ism as a philosophic theory will be helpful. 
In philosophy the idea of personality as the founda-
tion of knowledge is developed by such men as Berkeley, 
Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and Lotze. 107 In America Bowne, 
McConnell, Knudsen and Brightman are leaders in the 
personalistic movement. 108 These men are all agreed that the 
"immediateness of self-consciousness" is the starting point 
of philosophy. 109 Bowne says, "We are in a personal world 
from the start, and all our objects are connected vith ·this 
110 
world in one indivisible system." Personality is seen ·by 
these men as "the active ground of the world, and as contain-
ing in the mystery of its own unique being the key tf all the 
111 \ 
antinomies of metaphysics." The conscious personality ia 
both the "supreme value and the supreme reality in the 
universe.n112 
This highly idealistic "world of persona" is given being 
and meaning and held together by the "supreme person" at its 
head. 
107R. T. Flewelling, "Personalism," in Encyclopaedia .2.! 
Religion !!.!l!! Ethics, edited by James Hastings (Edinburghs 
T. & T. Clark, 1956), IX, 771. 
108Floyd Hiatt Ross, Personalism and :Y:!..! Problem .2.! !I!! 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), P• 1. 
109Flewelling, .2R.• cit., P• 771. 
llOBorden Parker Bowne, Personalism (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin and Company, 1908), p. 25. 
lllrlewelling, ~· .211•, P• 772. 
ll2Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Nature !.QS Values (New 
Yorki Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945), p. 113. 
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Metaphysioall7 it Cpersonalisml is idealistic in the 
sense that it olaims the so-called physical world is 
a form of spirit having no independent reality, the 
direct utterance of God throughout, "the ceaseless 
product of the divine energizing," "a mode of the 
divine activity ••• without any proper th!nghood," 
things and events being simply "forms of activity" 
of the supreme person.113 
This "supreme personality" is seen to exist "in and through 
the concrete continuous exercise of his personality, think-
ing, willing and sustaining all things.»114 The world of 
space objects which man calls nature has no substantial 
existence in itself, but is merely "the flowing expression 
and means of communication" of the supreme person and his 
responsive personal beings. 115 In the mysteries of the vol-
untaristic, activistic, causational personality lies the key 
to the nature of being, knowledge and truth. 
The tendency in secular personalism is to think of 
reality in concrete and personal terms rather than in abstract 
and impersonal terms, "To the personalist knowledge exists 
116 only in the concrete." The practical reason takes prece-
dence over the theoretical: "Not to form abstract theories 
but to formulate and understand this personal life of ours 
117 is the first and last duty of philosophy." To the person-
alist knowledge is gained through experience and through what 
ll3R ~~+t p 1 114Flewelling, on. cit., p. 771. OS S, .2..E.• . , • • .= 
115 8 Bowne, .2..E.• cit., p. 27. 
116Flevelling, .2..E.• .911., P• 772. 
ll7Bowne, .212• ,g,!i., p. 318. 
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can be inferred from experience: "• •• experience is first 
and basal in all living and thinking, and all theor.izing must 
go out from experience ae its basis, and must return to it 
for verification.n118 
The personalistic metaphysics is relational; it is based 
on participation and interaction between purposeful, active 
individuals. 119 
Being is implied in the capacity for intelligent 
causal action, or in the capacity for being acted 
upon. All that exists is the result or manifestation 
of a supreme, active, purposive intelligence which creates 
and sustains the world of lesser intelligences and 
thinga •. 120 
The personalist thinks in terms of cause rather than substance. 
"We owe our being to the divine energy rather then to our 
121 possession of a po~tion of the divine substance." 
It is difficult to determine exactly what influence this 
secular personalism has had on Emil Brunne~. That he agrees 
with many of its tenets ls obvious.. Brunner does acknowledge 
the influence of such personalistic philosophers as Martin 
Buber and Ferdinand Ebner on his theology. 122 He is un-
doubtedly not thinking of these ~women, but of the modern 
socio-psychological school when he says: 
118.Ih!.g_., p. 303. ll9Ross, ~· ,g,!1., P• 5. 
l20Flewelling~ ~· cit., p. 772. 
121Albert .Cornelius Knudson, "A Personaliatic Approach 
to Theology," in Contemporary American Theology, edited by 
Vergilius. J'erm. (New. York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1932), 
·1, 238. . 
122The Christian Doctrine_.2.f_!!!.e Church, p. 159. 
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No doubt the idea of personality and personal life 
plays a large part in the thought of modern thinkers, 
but an analysis of this conception or personality 
would show that modern man, when he apoaka of person 
and the personal, has in mind something which ultima·tely 
is quite impersonal, namely, a function within society 
and culture.123 
Brunner, like the secular personaliets, looks to peisonality 
as the k~y to the enigmas or being and truth. He places 
much theological stock in, for example, the relation between 
man and wife, as an informative analogy for the rela~ion 
be~ween God and man and the W~rd of God and faith~ 124 The 
knowledge or faith is directly related to a man's knowledge 
of his wife. It is an experiential, relational, participa-
tive communion rather than an intellectual affirmation of 
certain data. 
Brunner views reality as divided into the impersonal 
and personal, with a graded scale of being encompassing both 
dimensions. Brunner would say, according to Schrotenboer, 
that the whole complex of reality in all its parts partakes 
of both elements, the personal and the impersonal: "Neither 
the absolutely personal nor the fully impersonal exists any-
125 1 where or at any time." Along with Heim, then, Brunner wou d 
say that even ina~imate nature is "personal" to a certain 
extent. Only the Triune God, says Brunner, is genuinely 
personal, for "He is within Himself self-related, willing, 
123scandal, PP• 73-74. 
l24!h!!. Divine-Human Encounter, PP• 90, 162. 
125 
~. cit., p. 195. 
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knowing, loving Hi~selr.nl26 
The most accurate and illuminating way for man to view 
God, Brunner argues is as person: 
lle CGod1 is the Other .Qa!, ·the mysterious and 
unknowable One, who has his own proper name and whom 
we do not know because he is person. Personality is a 
secret; a mystery is hidden in it. Knowledge of a per-
son is possible only through revelation, and he reveals 
himself through hie word.127 
God is seen to be personal, then, in His revelation to man in 
Jesus Christ. "• •• the 'Word' of God, the decisive self-
communication of God, is a Person, a human being, the man in 
whom God Himself meets ua."128 
The self-revelation of God is no object, but wholly 
the doing and self-giving of a aubject--or, better 
expressed, a Person. A Person who is revealing Him-
self, a Person who demands and offers Lordship and 
fellowship with Himself •••• 129 
More will be said below with regard to God as Revealer; here 
it is enough to say that Brunner uses t~e personalistic cate-
gory to present not only the nature of God's revelation .but 
also the mysteries or the very Godhead itself. 
Brunner makes use or the personalistic categories because 
he sees a definite relation of similarity between God's being 
as person and the being or man as person, a relation which, he 
l26Me.,n in Revolt; ! Christian An.thropologY, translated 
by Olive Wyo?1(Philadelphia1 The Westminster Press, 1947), 
p. 219. 
127~ Theology o f Crisi§, P• 32. 
128~ Christian Doctrine gf 9.29., P• 15. 
l29The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 75. 
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says, "makes the use of such huruan, parabolic language 
legitimate."l30 Brunner operates with an activistic rather 
than with a substantial concept of person, according to 
Schrotenboer: "A person tto Brunner] does not refer to an 
ontological substance, but is an existontial de~ignation."1 31 
Brunner would consider it fallacious to view man in an 
objective, substantial manner. Man is more than mere empiri-
cal matter; he is spirit. 
Man can be person because and in so far as he has 
spirit. Personal being is "founded" in the spirit; 
the spirit is, so to apeaki the substratum, the 
element ot personal being. 32 
This "other dimension" of the spirit is the realm of the 
personal. Nothing can be known of this "spiritual," personal 
world except one personal spirit disclose itself to another. 
We can ourselves find the clue to things; they are 
objects, which confront us not in their own self-
activity--making themselves knovn--but as entities 
which, by processes of research and thought, we can 
learn to understand. But persona are not enigmas 
or this kind; a person is a mystery which can be 
disclosed only through self-manifestation. In this 
self-disclosure alone do we meet this parson as 
person; previously he or she is an "object,u a 
"something.ul33 
Man cannot himself think or a person; a person cannot be a 
mere object of his thought. "A person is that unique being 
which discloses itself and therofore enters into my thought-
world, so to say, as a stranger, affirming itself as an I in 
lJO~ Christian Dogtrine .2! Creation, p. 24. 
131.Q.Jl • .£1!.., P• 30. 
l32Brunner, ~.!!!Revolt, p. 237. 
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its own right.n1 34 There is no c~ntinuity or immediacy of 
thought here. lCnowledge of God who is personal comes only 
when He speaks to man. 
Personality is built upon relatedness. "To be person 
is to be in relation to someone," says Brunner. 1 3 5 What 
personality is in the strict sense can be understood only in 
confrontation with the personal God. Because God "calls 
me into communion with him, I become in the true sense of 
the word a person.«136 At least among Christians, there is 
no such entity ns a purely isolated person. "• •• the 
spirit is ••• sbove all, and first of all, relatedness to 
God, aa He reveals Himself' in His Word. nl'.37 
Another term which Brunner uses to describe this re-
latedness is "personal correspondence." "• •• all truth is 
understood as the ~ruth of a relationship, namely, the rela-
tion of perscn~f correspondence between the Word of God and 
human obedience-in-trust."138 This personal correspondence, 
just the opposite of the subject-object antithesis, is a 
matter of relationship in face-to-face encounter between 
two subjects, a divine ttThou" and a human "I." This rela-
133Brunner, Revela.1..!.2Jl !.!!.!! Reason, P• 24. 
134arunner, Sganda.l,, p. 41. 
135H!Ul, !.!l ~~, p. 221. 
137~ !D. Revolt, p. 239. 
l36soandal, p. 75. 
138!h!t. Divine-Human Encounter, p. 201. 
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tionship is logically unsatisfying, incongruous, and annoying 
to the desire for intellectual investigation,1 39 but within 
it, and within it alone, is real religious truth assimilated 
by man. When mania accosted faoa-to-face by God who demands 
a decisive answer to His revelation; when man accepts and ful-
fills his God-given gift of responsibility as a personal being; 
when man answers God with obedience-in-trust--then man truly 
becomes a person, a proper pole in the personal correspondence 
between God and man. 
For decision is the essence of personality. Only 
when man comas to a crisis and is compelled to choose 
between life and death does he become a personality. 
At the very moment when God challenges him to mako 
his decision man is given peraonality.14_0 
In this relationship, then, or decisive responsibility over 
against the revelation of God man discovers who he is and what 
truth is and who God is. Emil Brunner•s theological epista-
mology is built upon this personalistic premise. 
God as Revealer 
Jewett remarks, "· •• there can be no adequate under-
standing of what Brunner thinks about Christianity as a whole, 
apart from an understanding of his concept or revelation in 
particular.n141 Brunner h i mself says: 
139.I.lu..g,., P• 124. 140The Theology£!: Crisis, pp. 30-31. 
l4l!D!!l Brunner's Concepi 21: Revelation, p. 1. 
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Hero tin !..h!. Djvine-Humon Eneounterl I placed the 
biblical understanding of truth over and against the 
Greek understanding which ·iu the foundation of our · 
Western phi.losophy and science. Since then, all my 
work in dogmeties hes been done in the light cf this 
aspect: the God who communicates himself. As a result 
of thia, the old concept of revelation vas freed from 
ita intellectual misunderstanding and the basic connec-
tion between knowledge and ·communion c&ma to h~ve its 
rightful place. In this I see my rnost important contri-
bution to the theological concept of knovledge.142 
It would be impossible to understand Brunnar's theological 
epistemology without investigating his doctrine of revelation, 
and for this reason: for Brunner, true knowledge of things 
religious 1~ only attained in communion with the God who 
discloses Himself. God does not stand at the end of a long 
line or deductions or abstract speculation. Man does not 
know God unless and until He addresses him personally. 
nThrough God alone can God be known."l43 
Due to the fact that many studies have already b0en made 
specifically on Brunner's ccnoept of revelation, 144 and also, 
because a.n adequate treatment of this matter would entail 
more than a full-length thesis itself, the writer has chosen 
to state Brunner•s doctrine of revelation in somewhat cursory 
form. Much has already been said above with regard to Brunner's 
views on revelation; here only the high points of his position 
will be presented. 
l42The Theolo~l of Emil Brunner, edited by Charles W. 
Kegley, p. 12. 
l43Brunner, Medietor, p. 21. 
144sae, for exampla, Paul Jewett•s excellent analysis, 
~ Brunner's ConoeRt 2f Revelation, which is quoted above. 
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A, God Himself is the absolute Subject of revelation. 
1~ 5 God is prima~y, creative and without presuppositions. + 
Even as He reveals Himself to man, His Word "never becomes 
our word; the word of .Q.Y.£ soul, but remains the Word of 
God."14 6 Brunner says that God as Subject interrupts the 
"monologue or our thought of God, of our mystical feeling 
for Godn147 and remains the Subject- of the communication 
throughout. God never becomes an object of thought, but is 
always the Subject who shares Himself with subjects. 
But if it is true, as faith knows it to be true, that 
God's word ia the truth, it means that truth--absolute, 
ultimate, final truth--is not "something" that I can 
know as an object opposite men, neither is it reasoa 
or spirit, my knowing mind, but it is the divine Thou 
who, in His own initiative, discloses Himself to me. 
True, God is over against me, yet He is no object, 
but spirit. True, He is spirit, but not my spirit; 
He is . the absolute subject, which I am not.148 
Even in His ~evelation and because of it;149 God as 
absolute Subject remains unknowable and mysterious to man. 
"The better we know God, the more we know and feel that His 
Mystery is untathomable. 111 50 Outside of His self-e;ommunication 
l'-1 God as Person and Subject remains an absolute mystery; J 
within the context of His self-disclosure in Jesus Christ 
145Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter 1 p. 49. 
ll.,6Brunne r, ~ ui the Worl4, P• 80. 147Ibid., P• 
l~arunner, Christianitz §Ag, Civilisation, First Part, 
p. 39. 
149Brunnar, 'l'ha Christian Doctrine Q.! 9.2.g,, p. 118. 
23,. 
1 .. 0 
' l!?.!.g,. , p. 117. 15larunner, ~ and 1h.!, World,· P• 24. 
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this mystery is by no means resolved, but rather thereby tirst 
comes into its own as myetery. 152 Here at least man catches 
a glimpse of the full mystery or the nature and purpose or 
God. All the while, however, God is absolute Subject or the 
epistemological relationship. 
B. God discloses Himself through a personal address 
to the respondent. As in an encounter between two human 
beings person-to-person, God makes Himself accessible to 
the believer. He communicates Himself, not a "something," 
to faith. As a result, the believer no longer has an object 
to be pondered and discussed as in purely rational effort, 
but a "Person who Himself speaks and discloses Himself.nl53 
To the question of what God reveals to man, Brunner answers, 
"Not merely does He reveal His will-to-communion with us, 
His creatures; He reveals Himself, His very essence as Love, 
I 
1 154 
as self communicating Life." 
That Brunner's . Christology is closely intertwined with 
\ 
his concept or revelation is at once apparent. In His reve-
lation, God gives man Himself, and He gives man Himself in 
I 
the person of Jesus Christ. ' "Revelation here means the Word 
155 l or God as a human person." In Jesus Christ God's reve a-
tion becomes p~rsonal and 1t· becomes direct. 
l52Sohrotenboer, .Q.Jl• s!i•, P• 36. 
153Brunner, Ill!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 85. 
154christianity and Civilisation. First~. P• 38. 
155Brunner, Word and !h.! World, P• 21. 
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Since God's revelation is a disclosure, not of "some-
thing," but of Himself, it comes to man in the form of a 
direct encounter, a personal address. 
No longer is it a question or the insertion or 
something into the knowledge I possess, the expansion 
of the intellectual riches at my disposal; but it is 
answering personally when addressed •••• 156 
It is one Person lovingly communicating His heart to another 
person. 
c. Only through His revelation can God be known. 
The absolutely Mysterious is not only partially hidden 
from the natural knowledge of man; it is wholly inac-
cessible to man's natural faculties for research and 
discovery.157 
The God who is conceived by thought is an "intellectual idol," 
says Brunner. 1 58 
CGod in His revelation1 bursts through and destroys 
all the fundamental categories of thought: the abso-
lutely antithetical cha racter of the basic logical 
principles of contradiction and identity.159 
This viewpoint that a knowledge of God exists only in so 
far as there is a self-disclosure or revelation has profound 
implications for Brunner 1 s epistemological position. The knowl-
edge or God and or His "things" is given to man. The selt-
oentered circle of man's unbroken continuity is broken down. 
"The truth comes in its own way and in its own power, to you. 
156Brunner, I!!.! Rivine-Human Encounter, P• 89. 
157Brunner, Revelation~ Reason, P• 23. 
158l:lll! Christian Doctrine g.!: God, P• 136. 
159Revelat1on and Reason, PP• 46-47. 
160The Christian Doctrine g.!: Q.ru!, P• 125. 
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You do not possess it, it is not in you, it is given to you.n1 60 
"God is known only where He Himself makes His Name known," 
says Brunner. 161 Not through thought, nor conclusions drawn 
from the structure of the universe, nor· meditation on the 
nature of the Spirit;162 but only as He speaks to a man 
personally and reveals His S•lf can God be known and 
experienced. This knowledge through revelation is always 
a gift of the Self-giving God, and it is always unexpected. 163 
Man cannot knov the things of God by his own efforts. 
! 
D. The revelation of God is historical revelation. 
In the "higher" relation to God of speculation and 
mysticism, in the »religion of educated people," 
revelation means rather the emergence of the eternal 
basis of all phenomena into consciousness, the per-
ception. of something which was always true, the growing 
consciousness of a Divine Presence, which might have 
been perceived before, since it was there all the 
time.164 . 
In Christianity--and here lies the stumbling-block, says 
Brunner--revelation iD "connected with a fact that took 
Place Once and for ~11 .• n165 natural man ~ants a ... • • l1  
religion of immediacy, of timelessness, ,on universality. 
Natural man is scandalized by this insistence on the 
historical, the given. "• , • to Reason there is no greater 
161 l Ibid., p. 20. 
162Revelation ~ · Reason, P• 44. 
163Ibid., p. 29. 
164Brunner, Mediator, P• 22. 
165 42 Ibid., p. • 
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absurdity than to assert that for us the divine truth is an 
isolated fact, that it is disclosed to us in one single event.11166 
But, as Brunner writes, "Christianity is either faith in the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ or it is nothing."l67 ·With 
the unrepeatable, given, once-for-all, historical person of 
Jesus Christ "all theological statements about the divine 
revelation must begin ••• •"168 
The historical revelation is the ground of knowledge · 
for God's personal Being and God's personal Being 
is the actual ground (Realgrund) of His revelation.169 
In the incarnate Ohr.1st man knows God. 
The exact connotation of the term "historical" as used 
by Brunner has been the subject of debate. At one place he 
can say: 
When we reflect on the rise of faith, it becomes clear 
to us that a real event which transforms existence can 
occur only on the place of real events, that is, of 
historical events. For apart from real history, from 
the events that impinge on my existence, there .!.u. no 
reality that in the strict sense transforms existence.170 
But at another place, in almost Bultmannian tones, Brunner 
writes: 
Hence by revelation ve mean that historical event 
which is at the same t:i.me the end of history, that 
is, an event whi"ch, if it really did take place, by 
166~., pp. 106-07. 
167I.hJ!, Theology g.!:. Crisi~, p. 2. 
168!!!2. Christian Doctrine 2f. Creation, P• 52. 
169Revelation !.S.S. Reason, p·. 409. 
170!b..! Christian Doctrine ,2.!: ill.!, Church, p. 143. 
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its very force shattered the framework of history; 
in other words, that in fulfilling the purpose of 
history it ends it.171 
So~e light can perhaps be shed on this problematic area of 
Brunner•s approach to the historicity of Biblical events 
by looking at his dialectical answer to the question of 
such historicity: 
Yes, for it is in history that this revealed secret 
encounters me as truth. No, for it is the eternal 
God aho now speaks to me in this historical revelation. 
Thereby the historical event ceases to be hisiorical 
and becomes living presence. It is by present inspira-
tion that past incarnation becomes truth to me. It is 
by this historical revelatio~ or the incarnate vord 
that thi~ present inspiration can take place.172 
In so far as God's personal co·nfronta tion with man in Jesus 
\' 
Christ occurs now in this existential moment, it is trans-
historioal, and the question of historieity does not apply. 
But this present encounter is baaed upon and. finds its 
content in a historical once-for-a11· event which actually 
took place in Palestine almost two-thousand years ago. 
Brunner says that it is God's Holy Spirit who "bears 
witness to, and makes effectual, the historical Christ as 
a living personal presence.»173. To escape the dangers of 
both objectivistic174 and subjectivistic175 views of revela-
tion, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit must be set forth, says 
171Hediator, p. 27. 
l72ghristianity !,!lg Civilisation. First Part, P• 40. 
l73The . Christian Doctrine of the Church, p. 12. 
- --
174word .!.!!S ~ world, PP· 60-61.· 
175The Philosophy .9.!. Religion, p. 113. 
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Brunner. "Scripture is only revelation when conjoined with 
176 God's spirit in the present." The operation of the Holy 
Spirit . in making h.istorical events e~istantie.l 11:1 the key to 
solving the historical problem stated above. God's self-
communication and man's resultant obedience-in-trust come 
together in the work of the Spirit. 
E. The Bible is the indispensable means of revelation. 
' . 
Jewett says, "It is an open secret by this time that in 
matters of Biblical criticism Brunner aligns himself with a 
177 
rather liberal school of thought." Brunner admits, 
ti 
• • • I myself am an adherent of a rather radical school 
of Biblical criticism. • • • ,,178 He can make such a state-
ment as, "Faith in the infallible Bible is no _ionger possible 
for modern man. "179 h • • • ; • e ca n carry on a vociferous 
polemic against verbal insp i ration; and yet ha does .not 
lapse into a completely liberal position. Jewett catches 
the dialectic note of Brunner•s doctrine of the Bible as 
he s oys: 
rather than getting above the alternative of theo-
pneusty on the one hand a nd the abandonment of Scrip-
ture authority on the other, the pendulum of his 
thought simply swings between the two, now touching 
upon the one, now the other; now making assertions 
1 7 61'.b!!. Philosophy 2L Religion, P• 151. 
177Emil Brunner•s Concept of Revelation, p. 117. 
178!.h.!t Theology tl Crisis·, P• 41. 
179lli Christian Doctrine .2.! .:Yl.2, Church, p. 189. 
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vhich involve the identification of the Word of God 
and the words or men, now relativizing the function 
of Scripture ss a vehicle of revelation to th~ point 
of losing its normative character altogether.i8o 
It is, of course, understandable that Brunner, with his 
existentialist and personalietic intentions, vould differ 
from the position or Protestant Orthodoxy on Scripture. 
He sees Orthodoxy's insistence on the verbal inspiration 
and infallibility of the Bible as aprioristic and the height 
of objectiviam. He labels these doctrines aa evidences of 
natural man's inherent drive for assurances and security. 
Brunner makes such statements as the following about 
the centrality of tho Scriptures for the Christian faith: 
Christian faith is Bible faith. When a Christian 
speaks without qualification of God's rovelation, 
what he means is Holy Scripture.181 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
When the Christian speaks of the Word of God he means 
in the first place the Word of Holy Scripture.182 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The nature of faith is not to be understood by 
starting from the creed of the Church, but by starting 
with the Biblical witness.183 
tThe main thesis of Christianity runs thus:) ti34 knowledge of God is to be drawn from Scripture. 
180~ Brunner's Concept g.!: Revelation, P• 158. 
l8ll'.h!!. Philosophy !2.f. Religio~, P• 150. 
182vord and the World, p. 82. 
---
183The ~hristian Doctrine· g! !h!. Church, p. x. 
184The Philosophy 2f Relig!.2.D,, P• 150. 
---
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The Bible is the pre-condition of all faith, that 
which alone makes it possible~ And the whole Bible 
at that.185 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Christian faith is faith in tho Bible in the sense 
that the Bible alone is the place in which God speaks 
to us, ,1udges us as through His ·.word, acquits ue 
from condemnation, and imparts Himself to us as the 
self-bestowing love in which He creates us anew.186 
Brunner•s concern, however, is .that the Word cf God not be 
identified with the words of the Scriptures. 187 This would 
be the legalistic error that impairs the actual face-to-face 
encounter of Subject with subject in the present moment. 
This would lead, not to communion, but to .solitary, smug 
intellectualism. 
Brunner repeats over and over again the motto, "Christus 
.£!.!. et do~l~Y~ i.9.!:1:.e.!i~·" For its purpose of "cradling 
.Christ II the Bible is absolute authority: ".. • • t.he 
Scriptures are the absolute authority, in so far as in them 
the revelation, Jesus .Christ Himself, is supreme. 11188 
Christian faith is not founded o~ the letters of the Bible, 
but on "our relation to the content or that which is proclaimed 
lS5The Christian ~rine .Q.!'. ~ Church, P• 249. 
186 lli..!!•, p. 241. 
187Th~ Theology 2.! Orisia, P• 19. 
lSSThe Christian Doctrine or 9.9.9., P• 49. 
--- -
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in the Scriptures, or rather to ·the Person Himself, ·God mani-
.fest in the flesh, who speaks to me, personally, ·in the 
Scriptures.n189 Esch clause of the above quotation is abso-
lutely fundamental to Brunner•s approach to the Bible and 
revelation. 
F. Revelation is completed in faith's response. 
Jewett defines Brunner•s position here; 11Revalat:t.on is . • • 
incomplete apart from its subjective side. Revelation is 
address and response, personal correspondence.n190 Brunner 
says, "In faith itself God's self-communication finds its 
completion.n191 God communicates Himself in love; when this 
lova 13 known in responding love, communication has been 
consummated. God's revelation does not reach its goal apart 
from the ~knowledge and act, knowing and happeningn192 of 
faith. Reoeption of God's self-disclosure only occurs in 
faith, that is, in the "personal decision vhich in responsi-
bility answers God's challenge.n193 Revelation is thus a 
two-sided act; to abortively attempt its enclosure in a 
book is to miss God's Word entirely. According to Brunner, 
there is no revelation in the strict sense apart from faith's 
189 6 Revelat:1.on and Reason, P• l 9. 
190~ Brunner•s Conoe:Qj, .Q.! Revelation, P• 135. 
l91The Ohristian Doctrine of the Churoh, P• 171 • 
.__, ....,_ - ----
l92The ~n.§.-Human Encounter, P• 64. 
193word and the jorld, p. 28. 
53 
response. 
The aim of the divine revelation is at least twofold: 
communion with God and the brother, and self-realization. 
Since God makes Himself known to me, I am no longer 
solitary; the knowledge or God creates community, 
and indeed community is precisely the aim or the 
divine revelation.194 
Not only does the divine knowledge given to faith in revela-
tion supply the answer to the question of truth, but it creates 
fellowship between God and man as well. Revelation, aays 
Brunner, is "never the mere communication of knowledge, but 
it is a life-giving and a life-renewing communion."195 
The man who, by revelation and faith, takes part 
in the divine truth, at the same time takes part in 
the divine love, and is therefore taken into communion. 
To be in truth is to be in the Love of God, and to be 
in the Love of God is to become a loving person, to be 
in communion with God and men.196 
Men come to know and love each other as a result or God's 
self-disclosure of love; they also first come to know them-
selves thereby. "Man can only understand himself when he 
knows God in Hie Vord.nl9? The gift of true personality 
comes only through the Word of God. "Personal being in the 
full sense, in the nonlegalistio sense, hence the genuine 
sense, is no •neat' entity whioh is an isolated phenomenon, 
194Revelation and Reason, p. 27. 
195Ih!. Christian Doctrine .9! God, P• 20. 
l96christianitY !.ru! Civilisation. First Part, P• 38. 
197Brunner, Man in Revolt, P• 65. 
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but it is only !n !J21!! R!,!. ~ • • nl98 Apart from revelation 
and faith man's self-~etimate is bound to be inaccurate. 
The judgement we form of -ourselves is either realistic 
and cynical, or idealistic and illusionary. Apart 
from faith, even in the most serious exercise of our 
moral consciousness, we see ourselves in the a~tificial 
illumination of autonomy as tree beings who can do the 
good because we ought.199 
Only in the light of God's revelation, therefore, can man 
identify himself and find his place in the world. 
In summary, it might be said that if Brunner were .asked 
the question, "How does man know the th i ngs of God?" or, "How 
does man get to know his brother?," the concept o~ God's self-
disclosure in His historic and existential revelation would 
be absolutely crucial to his answer. Man "knows" the things 
of God, not as he knows a fact, but in communion with God, 
in person-to-person encounter with Him, an encounter 
instigated and brought about solely by the God who reveals 
Himself .• 
The Relation of Reason tQ Faith and Theology 
Jewett says correctly, "Brunner is far too astute a 
thinker to commit himself to an uncritical and naive irra-
tionaliam."200 Brunner would never say that ma~'s rational 
facult·ies play no part in faith or theology; he says repeat-
198Brunner, Revelation and Reason; P• 410 .• 
l99Brunner-, l'..ru!, Philos!Ullli 91, Religion, p. 77. 
200!!!!!! Brunner's Qonoept g,! Revelation, p. 86. 
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edly that reason is indispensable to both faith and theolo.giz-
ing. However, he becomes quite specific in definlng the proper 
sphere and limits of man's intellect. "The legitimate sphere 
of reason is: the things or the world."201 ~ 
The intellect is the power of perceiving the finite, 
especially the world of things and the like, and, 
with the aid of this knovledge the power to live and 
act in this finite world in a practical way.202 
. . 
In close agreement with Luther's distinction between "things 
below" and "things above," Brunner says simply, "Reason is 
not given us · to know God, but to know the world." 203 Reason 
is indeed given to man by God; but this does not mean that 
God allows Himself to be known by reason. Brunner makes this 
interesting observation about the "givenness" of all human 
knowledge: 
God is the ground of all knowledge of truth. All 
truth that we perceive and discover we perceive and 
discover by virtue of the light that comes from God. 
Eve.n the perception of the simplest mathematical 
truth is possible only through a ray from the light 
of God. God is the principle of all truth. But from 
this we have no right to infer that in all knowledge 
God may be known. Knowledge that comef from God is 
different from the knowledge of God.20 
Brunner, furthermore, contends that reason is capable 
201 
The Christian Doctrine ,2l, Creation,. p. 26. 
202 
Man .!Jl Revolt, PP• 250-51. 
203 . 
~~the Horld, p. 33. 
204 Revelation and Reason, P• 318. 
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of marking out its own boundaries of competency. 205 The 
reason can delimit itself to the things of this world, but 
so often, due to man's sinful state, it fails to do so. 
Thus this matter of drawing the line of competency becomes 
the great problem for man and for faith. 
The question for Christian theology is not whether 
the reason has any rights, whether the reason has any 
authority to judge what is true and what is false • •• 
but where the line must be drawn which delimits the 
sphere in which reason has complete control. It is 
not the validity of the criteria of reason as such 
against which faith has to fight, but the fact that 
they are turned into absolutes, making absolute claims, 
The problem is one of defining the sphere of reason.20o 
Brunner says that it is not the reason itself which is 
in opposition to faith, but the "self-sufficient re 8 son.n
207 
Faith does not imply a suicidal sacrifice of the intellect--
208 
"Jesus Christ is not the enemy of reason" --but it does 
require the limitation and control of reason. It is this 
limitation and this control which natural man cannot endure. 209 
205~ Philosophy of Religion, p. 73. (This writer 
feels that this claim is perhaps one of the weakest points 
in Brunner's presentation, a point that contradicts another 
emphasis of Brunner himself: natural man's inherent striving 
after autonomy. Natural man's reason does not know its 
bounds and cannot draw the line where its natural, this-
worldly competence ceases. Cf. §.malcald Articles, Part 
III:I:3; Epitome I:9.) 
206Revelation !.,!lg, Reason, p. 380. 
207Man jA Revolt, p. 244. 
208Revelai!.2..!! and Reason, P• 16. 
209Mediator, p. 43. 
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"The reason corisidera itsalf entitled to dominate everything: 
tc set up, and to dispooe of, tho criteria of all truth."210 
Once again, man's basic drive :for autonomy is seen at the 
base of hie epistemological problem. 
Although God's revelation does not in any way contradict 
what can be known of man in and through reason and experience,211 
nevertheless the reason is utte~ly incapable of breaking 
through "that ring of' immanence of the self-worJ.dn212 into a 
true knowledge of God and His Word. 
Here all the methods of appropriation and verification 
which are usually so uaeful--the methods by which we 
are able to prove the actuality of something whbh is 
said to hove happened, as ~ell as all our methods or 
clarification through analogy, argument, and proof--
break down completely.~ For the Cross and its meaning--
a s is explicitlY, stated--is unique, never to be 
repeated, and therefore far above all human analogies; 
it can never be understood along the lines of intellec-
tual argument.213 · 
Knowledge of the world as established by God in its given 
order is different from the knowledge or the Creator Himself, 
says Brunner. 214 Even though man, for example, the mysti~, 
might suppose he is independently breaking through into the 
mysteries of the transcendent by the powers of his reason, 
there is no hope that this can actually be the oase. 
210Revelation and Reason, P• 212. 
2l1Brunner, Man 1!! Revolt, P• 61. 
212Brunner, Revelation!!.!!.!!, Reason, P• 369. 
213 
;Ibid. , p. 166. 
214 
.JE!.d., p. 381. 
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Ruthlessly the reason spans the circle or immanence 
around me, even if the idea of transcendence belongs 
to this immanence. All the transcendence that I think 
out for myself is only transcendence within immanence; 
all that I describe as thoy within this my world of 
immanence is only "thou-within-the-world-of-the-self'." 
This world of immanence., in spite of all the variety 
that takes place within it, is at bottom a static 
system. No real communication takes · place.215 
What then of a natural knowledge of God, that point at 
which Brunner so notably differs with Karl Barth? Brunner . 
says, 
Even the man to whom God has not made His Name 
known is not without a certain knowledge of God; 
for a knowledge of the Creator forms part of the 
creaturely existence of man.216 
At another place Brunnor writes, "Apart from any special 
revelation, and indeed from a kind of inner necessity, the 
human spirit formulates the Idea or God, or so~ething simi-
lRr •••• 217 However, this knowledge is only a "confused 
and uncertain knowledge of God, a kind or twilight knovledge.n 218 
It does not create communion with the living God, 219 but 
ultimately must be called "an abstraction.n220 When Dale 
Moody makes the following judgment, this vriter holds that 
he is over-simplifying tb.e matter: 
215Ibid., P• 367. 
216The Cgristian Dootrin~ .2.! 9.2.9., P• 121. 
217Man !l! Revolt, p. 241. 
218Mediator, P• 151. 
219The Christian Doctrine 2! God, p. 121. 
-
220Revelation and Reason, p. 315. 
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But Brunner is not willing to limit our knowledge of 
God to special revelation. Where Barth rejects the 
idea of the image as a formal potentiality ror God 
Brunner retains it; where Barth speaks of a special 
revelation alone, Brunner affirms a general revela-
tion in nature and man •• , ,221 
Brunner does speak of an "ime.go verbi II existing within man's 
rational capacities in the same way as the "imago }ltl" exists 
in his person, 222 but he is quick to declare its imperfection 
and incompleteness. He does admit that the pagan can have 
knowledge of God, 223 but he carefully states that this 
knowledge is only an abstraction, a misconceived idea. There 
can be no valid knowledg~ of God and certainly no personal 
relaticnship with Him by man's rational efforts. As Brunner 
says: 
through tho revelation reason is placed in the 
wrong, namely, in all her attempts to comprehend 
and grasp the Divine which necessarily sprjng from 
reeson.224 
Brunner speaks often of the relationship between reason 
or knowledge and faith. He says that knowledge of an objec-
tive kind is antecedent to the personal act of faith : 
It is true, of course, that the personal act or trust, 
obedience and love is preceded by certain elements of 
objective knowledge--as also they precede the aot of 
221 QR.,~., p. 321. 
222 Revelation~ Reason, P• 119. 
223 Mediator, P• 121, 
224 ];bid., p. 43. 
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faith--but they are not the personal act itselr.225 
At another place, however, Brunner says that although faith 
is accomplished in a process of thought, it does not spring 
from thought, but rather from metanoia, from rethinking and 
redirection. 226 What he must mean by these two views is 
that . while faith is never without content, still it never 
springs from man's unilateral "decision" to believe. Orily 
God's Word creates faith. 
The truth, oonoeived in an abstract way, separated 
from the Person of God who speaks, is not the ulti-
mate, but the necessary pen-ultimate, which, however, 
is based upon and proceeds from the ·ultimate. Our 
nou@ therefore is the vessel but not the source of 
the Word of God. Where it receives the Word of God 
it is called: faith.227 
Schrotenboer speaks correctly when he says that to 
answer the question whether faith is knowledge or not to 
Brunner would not be simple. 228 Faith is an act of 
knowledge, according to Brunner, 229 but it is not knowledge 
of disposable objects but of disposing subjects. Brunner 
writes: 
225~elation and Rgason, p. 39. (Using Brunner•s 
analogy of the "knowledge relationeh1p 11 vithin wedlock, it 
might be aaid that this is the knowledge a man has of his 
wife prior to his oelfless trust and faith in her.) 
226Ibid., pp. 216-17. 
227Man !n Revolt, P• 245. 
228QJ?.. cit., p. 51. 
229Revelat1on ~ Reason, P• 34. 
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To the questiona "Is faith knowledge?" our first 
answer would have to be "No: it is not the same 
thing as everything else that ve mean by knowledge." 
It arises only where all knowledge is at an end, 
both objective knowledge, "explanation," and also 
the subjective knowledge that we call understanding. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
And yet faith is knowledge, true self-knowledge, which 
comes into existence only when what I already know 
about myself--that I am responsible, that I am guilty--
is taken up into this knowledge, confirmed and 
radicalized by it.230 
Faith is itself a thinking process; 231 it is accomplished in 
ideas; 232 but this thinking and these ideas are of a different 
kind than regular, objective thought. These are thoughts and 
ideas controlled by God; they are thoughts and ideas that 
arise only within the personal relationship. They are 
thoughts of personal correspondence, intimate communicative 
thoughts instilled by the operation of God's Spirit. 
faith does not become knowledge, after a process of 
rational activity; it is, itself, knowledge. I myself 
know, in my faith, that Jesus Christ is my Lord •••• 
It is not a knowledge that I have gained by my own 
efforts, but it is that which I now have, which is 
neither capable or proof nor, indeed requires proof. 
It is knowledge in the dimension of personal encounter: 
God Himself discloses Himself to me. It is 
revelation.233 
The knowledge of faith is thus knowledge in a dimension 
other than the dimension of common subject-object knowledge: 
230.'.l.h.!. Qhristian Dogtr1.ne g! the Church, pp. 260-61. 
231The Christian Doctrine or God, P• 73. 
- --
232.Il1!.g.., P• 73. 
233Revelation and Rea@on, pp. 178-79. 
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it is personal knowledge. It is the difference between 
knowing that a person is standing there and knowing that 
a person loves the knower. 
CFaithl is thus more like the acceptance of a 
communication than an act of knowing~ for in . it 
another communicates to me the mystery that only 
He knows--namely that He loves me--while we, when 
we speak of knowing, do not think or this word as 
having any relation to love. What we call knowledge 
and what we understand by fellowship or love lie on 
two quite different planes.234 
Objective knowledge rests on logic, on the certainty or 
sense-perception, on the laws of identity and coherence 
and non-contradiction; faith-knowledge rests upon God and 
His shared love. Faith-knowledge, therefore, cannot be 
proven; it has nothing to do with rational certainty. 
11 Fai th is personal certainty. "235 -Jewett is correct when 
he says: 
The Brunnerian concept of Paradox, which rests upon 
the dimensional difference between the Word of God 
and the word of man, tis] so crucial to an under-
standing or his solution of the problem of reason and 
faith.236 
According to Brunner, faith not only rejects reeaon but also 
fulfills it. Reason not only leads away from faith, but also 
leads toward it.237 While faith is 11 poles apart" from what 
234Brunner, Tse Qhristian Doctrine .2.! 1h.!, Church, P• 259. 
235arunner, Word and~ World, P• 75. 
236Em1l Brunner•s Concept 2.! Revelatio~, p. 96. 
237schrotenboer, 2B• .51!.i•, P• 58. 
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ie usually meant by objective knovledge, 238 yet it cannot 
exist without this knovledge. 239 The rational element is 
neither the source nor the content of faith, and yet it is 
incorporated within taith. 24° Another way of saying this is 
to say that even personal correspondence Mith a "Thou" is 
commingled with objective Knowledge, however imperfect, or 
that "Thou." 
Brunner says again and again that faith does not put 
the reason out of action or annihilate it, but that it is 
·through faith that the ~ord of God takes reason into its 
241 
service. As Jewett explains Brunner•s thought, "• •• the 
path of reason is curved by the gravitational centre of 
faith.« 242 Man essentially has been created not for thought, 
243 but for loving, says Brunner. Faith sets the reason free 
to be an instrument and participant in love, in fellowship 
with God and man. 
The unredeemed man has two centers, one of reason 
and the other of love •••• faith consists precisely 
in the fact that the heart and the reason again become 
one, that the reason becomes warmed, and the heart 
becomes rational.244 
238Brunner, !h!. Christian Doctrine 21: !h.! Qm!!:.£!1, P• 259. 
239Brunner, Revelation and Reason, P• 420. 
240schrotenboer, SW.• cit., P• 52. 
• 241Reveletion and Reason, P• 429. 
242E.ml! Brunner'a Concept g!," Revelation, p. 105. 
243Revelation ~nd Reason, P• 428 244Ibid. 
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An abrupt antithesis between revelation and reason is 
foreign to the outlook of both the Bible245 and the early 
theologians of the Churoh, 246 says Brunner. One does well 
to remember that Brunner sets up the problem in terms of 
"revelation and reason" and not "revelation or reason." 
Henoe the question can never be vhethe~, but to vhat 
extent and in~ sense, rsason and re~elation, faith 
and rational thinking can be combined with one 
another.247 · 
It is precisely at this point, at this proposed inner pene-
tration of the dimensions of reason and faith, that certain 
of Brunner•s critics attack him. 248 Critical reason cannot 
attain to the knowledge of revelation--it only leads up to 
it--and yet there can be no revelation apart from reason. 
The problem that Brunner encounters with this "dimensional" 
differentiation between faith and reason can be made more 
clear if one sees just how he views the various dimensions 
of reality. The picture is one of concentric circles around 
a given center. The center is the dimension of the person, 
with the circles or scientific theology and then the formal 
sciences proceeding outward from it. There is a penetration 
of the lower, non-personal dimension by the higher, personal 
24 5Ibid., p. 309. 
246Ibid., p. 310. 
247 Ibid., p. 311. 
248 Jewett, !!!!!!. Brunner's Concept of Revelation, P• 99. 
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one, from the center out. The competency of reason in the 
subject matter with which it is concerned is proportional to 
its proximity to the personal center: the farther from the 
center, the gr~ater the competency. The relation between 
faith and reason is thus proportional and not precise. The 
personal and the rational interpenetrate all areas of human 
activity, but proportionateiy. 249 It is this proportionate 
interpenetration scheme which gives many critica~. many or 
whom are perhaps looking for a sharply defined scheme present-
ing the areas of competency of both faith and reason, a diffi-
cult time vith Brunner's position. 
Another helpful picture Brunner presents is that or 
tangential and centripetal forces representing reason and 
faith respectively: 
The purely rational element of thought, logic, has 
the tendancy to go straight forward from each given 
point; but faith continually prevents this straight-
forward movement by its pull tovards the tevangelical1 
Centre. So instead of a movement in a straight line 
there arises a circular movement around the Centre--
and that is a picture o~ real theological thinking. 
Theological thinking is a rational movement of thought, 
whose rational tendency at every point is being 
deflected, checked, or disturbed by faith. Where 
the rational element is not effective there is no move-
ment of thoughtJ no theology; where the rational ele-
ment alone is a~ work, there arise~ a rational specula-
tive theology, which leads away fro~ the truth of 
revelation. Only where faith and ra~ionality are 
rightly interloc·ked can we have true theology, good 
dogmatics.250 
249Brunner, ,evalation and Resson, p. 383. 
250The Christian Doctrine g! ~, p. 76 • . 
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Brunner insists that man can never separate the 
abstract framework of reason and doctrine from the personal 
Presence contained in them. 
We know that we can never heve the one without the 
other, and we know at the same time that the whole 
point is to have the personal contained within the 
abstract framework •••• doctrine is indissolubly 
connected with the reality it representa.251 
Whenever God speaks to us He "says something," says Brunner, 
and therefore "a certain amount of doctrine must be present 
before living faith can come into being.« 252 The exact rela-
tion between the doctrine and the revelation is "incommen-
surable.n253 The difference betuean them is abysmal, and yet 
the connection between them is essential. 
It is, after all, the purely human faculty of thought 
which qualifies the theologian for his work. 2 54 Reflection, 
concepts, thought-forms, logical processos of proof--thase are 
all the proper activities of the theologian as well as the 
philosopher. Theological knowledge is in that second circle, 
once removed from the personal center, and this distinction 
must be carefully maintained. 
The difference between the knowledge of faith and 
theological knowledge, which is so difficult to 
251!!:!§. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 111. 
252Ibid. ,· p. 120. 
25.3Ibid. 
254Brunner, lli Q.b_ristian Doct·ri ne 21: God. p. 75. 
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define, and yet so necessary, is not one of subject 
or of content, but one of the form or dimension of 
existence. Theological or dogmatic knowledge is, .it is 
true, the knowledge or faith in accordance with its 
origin, but not with its form. One who thinks in 
t~rms of theology must, so long as he does this, pass 
f~om th~ attitude of the worshipper to that of the 
thinker who is 9oncerned with his subject. Greater 
clearness ·and precision of theological concepts can 
o~~y be ga~ned at the cost of directness of faith 
and that readiness for · aotion which it contains.2~5 
In face of doctrinal errors or heresies, in face of the 
questions which necessarily arise in the believer's mind, in 
face ot the difficulties which accompany .the original 
Biblical doctrine,256 and especially in face of the need of 
every Chr i stian man to know the meaning of "the Father in 
Heaven, the forgiveness of sins, Atonement through the Son 
of God, and tha Work of the Roly Spirit,"257 the Church must 
ever be vitally concerned vith doctrinal clarity and accuracy, 
says Brunner. However, this more impersonal, objective con-
cern for sound doctrine "must always come second«258 (and 
between this "second" and "first" mission of the Church 
yawns a dimensional divide) to the personal address of God's 
Word, Jesus Christ who is the Truth, to the heart of every 
me.n. 
255 Ibid., p. 41. 
256 Ibid., p. 40. 
257.llli•, p. 10. 
258 Revela~ion and Reason, p. 153. 
CHAPTER II 
HEINECKEN, KANTONEN AND SITTLER COMPARED WITH BRUNNER 
Martin Heinecken 
It has been shown that the theological epistemology of 
Emil Brunner clusters around six major foci: 
a. The ' particular bent of his position is evoked 
largely in antithesis to objective intellectualism 
within the Church, and especially within Protestant 
Orthodoxy. 
b. Biblical knowledge and truth is set over against 
Greek knowledge and truth. 
c. The subject-object split of philosophical, analytic 
epistemology gives way to a Subject-subject rela-
tional framework of knowledge in Biblical epistemo-
logy. 
d. Theological personaliam is the key to Brunner's 
epistemology. 
e. God, in His self-disclosure, is the absolute 
Subject of religious knowledge. 
r. Wh j le reason is essential for both faith and 
theology, it always serves a secondary function and 
is never to be mistaken for the primary personalis-
tic means of "knowing" God. 
In this second part of the study, the viewpoints on this 
subject or Martin Heinecken, Taite Kantonen and Joseph Sittler 
will be presented. The same six divisions or categories used 
in Chapter I will serve as the basic framework for this chapter. 
Thus Martin Heinecken 1 s thoughts on the historical perspective 
of this problem, the difference between the Greek and Biblical 
traditions in the area of epistemology, the place of the 
subjective and objective in theological epistemology, end so 
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on through the six divisions, will be presented. Heinecken 
will then be followed by a similar study or Kantonen, and 
Kantonen by Sittler. 
None of these three American Lutheran theologians admit 
to an excessive dependence upon Brunner for their thought in 
the area of the nature and perception of religious truth. 
Each of them refers to Brunner a number of times by way of 
quotation or allusion, 1 but most cases of similarities in 
position cannot be explained as prima-facie dependence of 
the Lutherans upon Brunner. It is, of course, possible that 
all four men are deriving their homogeneous portions from a 
common source. 
1Both Brunner2 and Heinecken3 are heavily "' 
indebted to Soren Kierkegaard and to existentialist thought; 
it is probable that Kantonen and Sittler profit from Kierke-
gaard also, even if not in such an outspoken manner. It 
might be added that Kierkegaard's famed battle against sterile 
1 Martin J. Heinecken, !h!, Moment Before QQ,g, (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 111. 
Martin J. Heinecken, "Currents in American Theology," 
Lutheran World, III (March, 1957), 368. 
T. A. Kantonen, The Message of the Church 19. 1h.!, World 
,2.!: Today (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941), 
p. 141. 
T. A. Kantonen, ! Theology .!:.2.£ Christian Stewardship 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956), P• 73. 
Joseph Sittler, The Doctrine g,!: 1h§. Word (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, l94sT;' PP• 26, 36, 54, ~ 
2nale Moody, "An Introduction to Emil Brunner," !h!, 
Review !nd Expositor, XLIV (July, 1947), 313 • 
. 
3 ncurrents," .2.la• oit., P• 362. 
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intellectualism in the Church coincides quite nicely with the 
major emphasis of each of these four men. But this study does 
not have as its intention the tracing of dependencies in the 
thought of these four theologians; it only seeks to present 
and compare their respective positions within the framework 
of the six categories listed above. 
The historical perspective 
Although Martin Heineoken does not investigate the history 
of philosophy as thoroughly as does Brunner to pinpoint the 
foundations of a subject-object antithesis type of epistemology 
,,. 
within theology, ' he does repeatedly refer to Protestant v 
Orthodoxy in much the same vein as Brunner. He, too, sets 
up the period of seventeenth century Orthodoxy as the major 
antithesis to hie ovn position. Heinecken says that Orthodoxy's 
concern for maintaining doctrinal purity was correct, but that 
its method of doing so was misguided and ill-founded. He 
writes: 
tLutherJ returned to a biblical orientation completely 
foreign to the scholastic orientation, and yet it vas 
precisely to that orientation that seventeenth-century 
orthodoxists returned and while they wrestled nobly 
to do justice to the dynamic of the gospel, they never-
thele•s straitjacketed end imprisoned it. With ever 
finer end finer rational distinctions they tried their 
best to do justice to the mysteries or the faith and 
to safeguard them against heresy. But because the 
basic orientation ot the philosophy with which they 
operated was wrong, it resulted in any number of the 
most fearful distortions.4 
4christ Frees~ Unites (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 
1957), P• 68. 
71 
Heinecken says the philosophical orientation upon which 
Orthodoxy was structured was that of scholasticism. In such 
doctrines as the communicatio idiomatum and the kenosis, says 
Heineoken, this scholastic bent is especially prevalent. 5 
Also in the doctrine of God, the scholastic-Aristotelian 
framework is obvious. 
So, for example, the doctrine of God followed the 
pattern of the definition of other terms, classifying 
God in the class of personal beings and then distinguish-
ing him from other members of this class by various 
attributes, such as absoluteness, aseity, holiness, and 
so forth, arrivi ng at these attributes Xi!. eminentiae, 
via negationis and !JA causalitatis. This is boxing God 
up very neatly and, even if the anthropomorphisms ar~ 
recognized as inadequate, the whole procedure cannot 
do justice to the living God, who in the Bible is not 
ever defined in this way, but only described in his 
actions in the most lordly, quite arbitrary, irra-
tional, offensive, contradictory fashion. Once having 
boxed up God in the deiinition, it is the very devil 
to liberate him again. 
This attempted "boxing up" of God in the definition, the idea 
or the theological system is the very antithesis to true 
knowledge of God, Heinecken would argue. It is just this 
attempt at explaining religious truth in a nice, coherent 
compendium of doctrines with which Luther had broken. 
Not only did Orthodoxy revert to a previous scholastic v 
doctrinal framework, but American Lutheran theology, in its 
close adherence to Orthodoxy and its methods, unwittingly 
promulgated the same perversion. 
5Ibid., p. 70. 
6Ibid., PP• 68-69. 
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American Lutheran theology ••• generally adherred to 
the seventeenth century orthodoxy with remarkable con-
sistency. Practically ell the textbooks on which 
Lutherans until very recently were trained follow the 
same pattern--a repristination of seventeenth century 
Lutheran orthodoxy es compiled in Schmid's Doctrinal 
Theology .Qf 1h!l, Evangelical Lutheran Church (Hollaz, 
Quenatedt, Chemnitz, Gerhard, eta.) •••• This theology 
had the great merit of being o bulwark against the con-
fusion of philosophical speculation, but as recent research 
has shown, it clearly marks a departure from the theology 
of Luther and a relapse into the Aristotelian categories 
with which Luther had broken.? 
' Heinecken, like Brunner, sees in this type of theological ,/ 
endeavor the whole trend toward self-security. "In the objec-
tive sacraments and in a plain coherent system of doctrine 
based on an infallible Bible there is a refuge from the 
8 
anxiety of the human situation." But this refuge within 
Man-made systems and assurances is a false refuge, says 
Heinecken, and one that can only lead avay from Him who is 
the true Refuge. 11 • • • the living God is not apprehended 
in this wsy. When ycu grasp the idea, you clasp an idol to 
your bosom. n9 
Heinecken holds that existentialist categories and thought- v 
forms hold the key to theological truth and that they can 
1 render the 6hurch of this day a "much better service" than 
the scholastic-orthodox thought patterns of the seventeenth 
7Heineoken, "Currents," .Q.12• cit., PP• 361-62. 
S Ibid • , p. 3 6 3 • 
9Moment, p. 234. 
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century.lo Heineoken is tacitly agreeing with the movement 
he is describing as he says: 
Common also to this whole group Cneo-or·thodoxy) is the 
emphasis upon event, ~noounter, crisis, paradox, and a 
differentiation of the Hebrew-Christia~ thought-forms 
from Greek and other alt~rnat1ves. Revelation is 
personal encounter and not th.e making k'nown or· true 
propositions. Crisis replaces progress and evolutionary 
development. The human situation in existence is ana-
lyzed with the help of Kiarkegaard and existentialist 
theology,11 
Heinecken uses the categories or existentialist theology 
listed above almost without exception in his own presentation, 
It is his involvement in existentialist thought primarily -
which moves him to see in Protestant Orthodoxy a tangential 
emphasis in the field or Biblieal truth and epistemology. 
Greek versus Biblical concepts of knowledge 
Heinecken goes to some pains to distinguish between a 
static, objective Greek approach to truth and theology and 
a dynamic, existential, Biblical approach, The existentialist 
themes,in particular, show through in his position, With 
regard to the personal versus the abstract levels of truth, 
he says, "• •• the particular must always take preference 
12 
over the universal," and"• •• this business of abstracting 
lOchrist Frees~ Unites, P• 72, 
ll11currents," _q;e. ill•, P• 366. 
12God 1!l..1h!. §paoe ~ (Philadelphia: The John C, Winston 
Company, 1959), P• 70. 
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from the particular also involves a great loaa.n13 The 
here and nov, the individual, the concrete, as contrasted 
with the g•neral and abstract is the important factor within 
the epistemological God-man relationship. 
In this relationship the "moment" ls the. decisive factor 
and not a timeless, unalterable, static body or truths. 
Here in this moment when God encounters man, not in v 
an instant of recollection, but in the begetting of 
the truth in him, there is compressed all eternity • 
• • • This moment is the rullnesp of i!.m.!• It is quite 
different from that other ever-present possibility or 
realizing the eternal truth of the reason in which no 
encounter with the living God is involved, but only 
the awareness of certe1n "ideas."14 · 
Because of this present, existential nature of the God-
~nn relationship, Heinecken holds that there can be no fixa-
tion of theology in a eystem adequate for all times. Theology, 
in order to express the truth of the gospel, must remain in 
constant flux. An absolute, once-for-ell solidification of 
doctrine attempting to set forth the truth of God and man in 
. 15 
their relationship is "a monstrosity," and ultimately a 
rejection or the sola fide principle. 
Suoh unity of faith is, however, not achieved once 
and for all by agreement upon one docirinal system 
fixated for all times in precisely those terms. 
This would be confusing the- vord of man and the word 
l3Ibid., P• 30. 
14Heinecken, Moment, P• 104. 
15..lll!g,., p. 8. 
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of God, a man-made theology with the actual divine 
self-impartation. This would make man the master, 
who baa God boxed up in these formulations and vould 
be a denial or justification by taith.16 
Further to demonstrate the difference between Greek 
"I-It" and Biblical "I-Thou" truth Heinecken on several 
occasions uses the analogy of "wriat-watch time" (Greek) 
over against "alarm-clock time" (Biblical). 17 One type of 
truth emphasizes tho timeless, the regulated, the systematic; 
the other stresses the punctiliar, the awakening, the present 
call to aotion. 1 The one type of t~uth can be anticipa ted and 
I . 
controlled by man; the other catches man unexpectedly and 
\ 
demands a response. 
Along with Brunner, Hoinecken complains that objective v 
thought in the Greek tradition te~ds to build up an autonomy 
and a smug self-sufficiency within the knower. 18 But not so 
with the Word of God. Here man is never in control; he never 
has a manipulable objeot at his disposal; there is no guaran-
teed authority either of infallible hierarchy or book--man 
19 lives by faith, and faith is always a risk. - The same 
l6Heineckan, Christ Frees !.ru! Unites, P• 49. 
17He1neoken, Space Age, p. 66. See also: Martin J. 
Heineeken, Beginning ind!!!§. 9.! ~ World (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg P~ess, 1960), p. 26. 
18Moment, p. 226. 
19Martin J. Heineoken, "The Tension between Love 
and Truth,11 ~ Lutheran Quarterly, XI (August, 1959), 206. 
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situation pertaina in life in general, says Heinecken: 
In logic thero are nothing but static relationships 
which eternally are what they are and cannot possibly 
change. • • • But in life, which is always in flux, 
always in process ot bgcoming, there oan b~ neither 
logical necessity nor absolute consistency nor ebso-
lute certainty.20 
In the one type of relaticnsbip, man lives by guaran,tees 
which he himself can manipula te; :t.n the other he lives by 
faith. In the one his knowledge of God is direct and deter-
minate; in the other it is always in§..!?..!!!.• 
Heineoken makes frequent use of the term "raradox" to 
denote the sign of B1blical truth as opposed to the non-
contradictory nature of Greek truth. The religious paradox 
1s se en as "the absolute barrier which blocks the way to a 
mars intellect appropriation of a God-ides and forces man to 
be confronted with the living God in the 'hiddenneas• of his 
revelation."21 Heinecken says that whenever a Christian 
I 
talks about the God-relationship he is confronted vith some-
thing which he cannot understand and which is a mys~ery to 
I 
him, and thus he necessarjly finds himself involved in para-
22 · doxical language. With somewhat Bultmannian overtones Hein-
eoken explains just vhat he means by labeling the Christian 
20 Noment, P• 64. 
21 Ibid., P• 22. 
22 Ibid., P• 73. 
-
77 
faith "paradoxical": 
So it is misleading to say that a certain "fact" is 
paradoxical. The fact ~s "incomparable" and it is 
the language used in attempted description and 
attempted communication of this tact which ia 
pnradoxica1.23 
Thie is far different from the Greek intellectualist notion 
that doctrines and systems can adequately enclose the mysteries 
of God. Heinecken concludes that the paradox is one of the 
very basic categories of systematic theology which must be 
preserved for twentieth century theology. 24 "There is some-
thing about the Christian proclamation which makes a mere 
intellectual acceptance impossible."2 5 The paradox is in 
the proclamation, however, and not in the fact itself. The 
fact, for example, of the resurrection, is what it is and 
like no other fact; it baffles description. Thus it cannot 
be communicated directly or logically or objectively by 
language; it can merely be pointed at. The fact must be 
assimilated via an experiential involvement prompted and 
maintained only by the Lord Himself. 
Heinecken maintains that the gospel is in "a class by 
itself."26 The distinction between the t~uth and knowledge 
23 Ibid., P• 57. 
25Ibid., P• 6. 
24 
.Il2!g,., P• 382. 
26
"The Pre-theological Curriculum," !h!, Lutheran 
Quarterly, II (November, 1950), 428. 
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of the gospel and the truth and knowledge ot, tor example, 
mathematics, is qualitative and not quantitative. And, as 
Heineoken says, "• •• you can never through quantitative 
changes leap over into a new quality.n27 Christianity and 
Christian epistemology are "not merely a matter of the way 
in which we ordinarily communicate ideas because we share the 
referents of the world involved •••• No knowledge is 
imparted in the simple way •••• n28 In the following state-
ment Heinecken further explains the qualitative difference 
between the two kinds of knowledge: 
To possess the truth of God is something other than 
a formal correspondence between words or thoughts in 
the head and something objective and outside of the 
mind to which these ideas correspond or with which 
they are identical. This is not what the Bible means 
by knowing God. God is not a reality corresponding 
to my idea of him in my mind, any more than my wife 
or any person is. We just have to rid ourselves of 
such Platonic notions. fTo know God is to be known of v 
him, and this is a matter of right relationship, as 
has so often been pointed out after the analogy of the 
sexual relation. The God of the Bible does not 
correspond to any single idea in man's mind. He is not 
the archetype of an idea. He is the living God who 
confronts man, stands over against him, addresses him, 
face to face, eye to eye, even though this is in a 
medium or mask.29 
Truth and the knowledge of the truth to Heinecken, as well 
as to Brunner, is a relational process; it is found in the 
encounter an~ not at the end of a syllogism. 
27Moment, p. 182. 
28 6 
~., P• • 
29nTe.nsion," .2.l2.• ..£!!., PP• 201-02. 
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The subject-object split and beyond 
Brunner has ·been shown to overcome the subjec·t-object 
antithesis with his "personal correspondence" ~ormulation. 
Heinecken acknowledges perfect agreement with him on this 
point.30 Heinecken says: 
He Cman1 cannot grasp God as the object of his thought--
he can only encounter him person to person. God always 
remai ns the subject who continues to address man, to 
hold him responsible, to keep him in front or himself. 
Man can never reverse this relationship and make God 
the object.31 
God is always the Subject, and, according to Heinecken, 
He is only known in subjectivity. "Though objectively 
present God is discerned only in inwardness.n32 Heineoken 
makes stronger statements tha~ Brunne r regarding truth as 
subjectivity. He writes: 
The reassuri.ng presence of the atoning and victorious 
Lord is discernible only inwardly by the one who is 
not just a spectator but a participator. Hence truth 
is aubjectivity.33 
And furthermore, Heinecken writes: 
It is God hlmselt who is encountered only subjectively 
and never objectively. All the resuitant affirmations 
30 «Bultmann's Theology and the Message of the Preacher," 
I!!!, Lutheran Quarterly, VI (1954), 294. 
31 72. Moment, p. 
32 85. Ibid .• , P• 
33 
Ibid., 270. P• 
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of faith are made only by the one who has experienced 
this encounter for hi~self.34 
' 
Properly understood, Heinecken and Brunner are agreed here. 
I 
T~ey both say th~t God is known only through personal in-
volvement. Both say that God is indeed objectively present 
in His revelatjon, but that this revelation can only be 
appropriated by a decisive, inner correspondence. It is 
not an instance of a subject grasping an object but of a 
Subject coming face-to-face with a subject. 
Personalism as the key 
Once again, Heinecken is in close agreeman·t wfth Brunner 
in finding the person-to-person rel·ationship the most apt 
analogy in describing the God-man relationship. Heinecken 
writes: 
Moreover, in the exigencies or life, the supposed 
certainty of knowledge forsakes man, thus indicating 
that in the God-relation a different kind of knowledge 
is required in the very nature of the personal rela-
tionship. Here "knowledge" is a relation of"personal 
correspondence," a "knowledge" in the intimate sense 
of participating in the other as in the intimacy of 
the sexual union. It is a relationship of actual 
obediencG-in-trust, a relationship of having the other 
impart, not ideas or gifts only, but actually himselt.35 
In this dimension of personal relationships, Heinecken warns · 
that the statistical, quantitative categories of the objec-
34
~., P• 226. 
35 
.!1:?.!s.•, PP• 142-43. 
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tive, natural sciences simply do not apply. This is also 
true, to a certain extent, of theology as a scientific endea-
vor: the personalistio categories often do not apply. 
A method of prediction and control simply destroys 
the personal relation. It turns the I-Thou relation 
into an I-It relation, It turno the relation where 
two personal beings confront each other in personal 
address into a relation where the one uses a thing 
merely for his purposes, manipulating it and pushing 
it arQund, Another person dare never be used in this 
way.36 
In a similar vein, Heinecken says elsewhere that the moment 
one reduces the living person confronting one (whether man 
or God) to a definition or an aQstract thought, one loses 
him,3 7 "An individual person cannot be thought but only 
encountered, Neither can God be thought but only encountered.»38 
The letter smothers the spirit. 
The fact that God reveals Himself in a personal manner 
necessarily sets certain limits on man's penetration into 
God's mysteries. Just as with another person, 39 mon can knov 
only as much as God discloses, and this, not in an objective, 
tabulatable set of data, but only in a living obedienoa which 
often must "trust that revelation in oontradiotion to the svi-
dence.1140 
36Heinecken, snace AB.!., P• 67 • 
.37christ Frees JJ.\9. Unites, p. 69, 
38Home~t, p. 147. 
39uein.e.oken, Space Age, pp. 107-08, 
40Heinecken, Moment, P• 111. 
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It is idolatry to find a certainty other than that 
of the per~onal relation or trust 1n the livi~& God 
who confronts one and calls one to decision. When this 
confrontation ceases one communes in the chambers of 
one's own mind with a logical essence instead of with 
that living God who cannot be so roduoed.41 
Heinecken, along with Brunner, but not as extensively 
as Brunner, points out that the decisive factor in God's 
personal revelation and man's personal response is the Person, 
Jesus Christ. The person of Jesus Himself is essentially 
what makes the God-man relationship personal. "The Church 
proclaims the personal Truth, with whom we must enter into 
a personal relation of trust, confidence, and obedience.»42 
This fact that God revealed Himself in a person is only half 
of both Brunner's and Heinecken 1 s development of the personal-
istic theme, ho~ever. As far as epistemology is concornod, 
the annlogy which they both draw between the knovledge one 
person has of another (particularly in the marriage relation-
ship) and the knowledge one has of God and of religious truth 
is the point of chief importance. Their entire theological 
epistemology is based on this analogy: man's knovledge or 
God is like man's intimate knowledge of another person, with 
all the implications and limitations this involves. 
God as Revealer 
Heinecken, like Brunner, not only sees the doctrine of 
41 Tl-!"~ 57 58 42ttTension," on. _cit., p. 20 5. 
~·, PP• - • .::..s:. 
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revelation as being closely intertvined within the area of 
epistemology, but he also oomes to much the same conclusions 
in hie elaborations of the doctrine of revelation as does 
Brunner. Severai distinctly Lutheran aspects oome through: 
an emphasis on the sacraments as a means of revelation, and 
the reference to "masks" as the framework of actual revelation. 
But for the most part there is close coincidence of thought. 
Heinecken insists that God remains the Subject throughout ~ 
the revelatory process. "God is absolutely other from the 
existing individual but he has revealed himsolf and therefore 
I 'know' him in this revelation. But he still remains the 
subject. 11 43 Heineoken says that "no one--no witness, no 
human teacher--co.n directly communicate the God-relationship," 
but thot this i~ solely God's prerogative.44 
Q..Q..q reveals himself. It is God vho is the initiator 
of the revelation. This is not an act of human discovery 
as when man discerns an indubitable truth with the power 
of his reason. Nor is it a human hypothesis set up 
by man in an effort to account for certain experienced 
phenomena. It is rather God on his own initiative 
encountering man in his existence at a time and 
plaoe.45 
God is always at the beginning as well as at the end of reve-
lation. He discloses Himself. 
Heinecken also speaks of the otherness of God even in 
4.3Moment, p. 80. 
44 Ibid • , p. 2 5 8 • 
45Ibid.·, p. 102. 
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the midst or His revelation. As he says, "God has a secret 
which he does not share with u~.u46 The difference between 
God and men is not only one or degree, but or kind as well. 
"The unseen and unseeable God is, quite simply, in a dimension 
different from that or space. • • • n47 Whan man is confronted 
by God, says Hein~ckan, he is confronted "not only by a power 
and a knowledge and a goodness which are quantitatively beyond 
him. There is a qualitative differ~nce.n4S All metaphysical 
speculation, all attempts to reduce God to a simple idea, all 
deductive assertions as to God's nature in itself are blocked 
by an absolute barrier. 
God in and for himself ia still "unknown" as the 
absolutely, qualitatively different about whom 
nothing can be said, except by way of pointing 
out tha differanoa and the mystery •••• As for 
asserting his metaphysical essence and attributes, 
thia ia a presumptuous and vain endeavor.49 
Heinecken makes an important distinction between the onto-
logicul and spiritual uspeot.s of this problarn when ha says: 
So the absolute qual1tative otherness of God, it is 
said, is not a metaphysical otherness at all. It is 
not a mattor of s ome chasm between man and the God 
in whose image he is after all made and whom, in 
some sense, he must resemble. The difference, it 
is said, lies in the realm of the "religious" and not 
that of metaphysical speculation.50 
46Beginnilig .w i.ru! of' the World, p. 45. 
47J;bid., P• 25. 
48.M2,men~, p. 69. 
49..IJ2.!g,., pp. 109-10. 
50 . Iblcl•, P• 117. 
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The above statement would seem to deny the validity of 
any kind or analog_!!. antis. The question might be raised, 
however, as to what this position, if consistently held, would 
imply if applied to Heinecken's own personalistic analogy. 
Due to God's complete otherness, perhaps even this analogy 
cannot be pressed as far as both Heinecken and Brunner press 
it. What Heinecken is trying to say here, however, is that 
even the category of "completely other" can be construed 
as a metaphysical category. He wants to take God's trans-
cendence out of the area of ontology and put it back into the 
area of the existential. God is completely, inestimably 
above a specific man as he confronts that man and demands an 
answer. 
Thus, even in His revelation, God remains hidden and 
mysterious. Even in His revelation He is known in a dif-
ferent way than the truths of reason or even other histori-
cal persons are known. "Faith is never turned to sight," 
says Heinecken.51 God always wears a mask in His revelation 
and confronts man in such a way that He is never directly 
discernible.52 Heinecken repeats over and over again: God 
can be known only with the eyes of faith. "• •• God never 
did, does not now, and never will appear to man directly for 
all to see • ••• It is only to the eyes of faith that the 
51 
Ibid., P• 112. 
52 
.Iill•, P• 68. 
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living God is discernible.n 53 Thus revelation and faith are 
always corollaries; . there o.annot be one without the other •. 
It must be made clear at this, point that tai th, as Heinecken 
is using it here, is no. mere acceptance of statements or a~sent 
to doctrines. "The revelatory eyents I must apprehend with my 
whole being, with the risk of my life and the transformation 
of my existenoe.n54 This is the involvement which faith entails. 
God is known through the act or inner transformation of 
one's being, says Heinecken. 55 Thus sanctification is not 
considered as a result of the self-disclosure of God; it is 
in the very act of renewal that God's self-communication 
is truly realized. Repentance and renewal are thus prere-
quisites for true knowledge of God. "The disciple ••• 
must in this moment of encounter be born a new creature. 1156 
Speaking of the Pentecost gift of the Spirit, Heinecken says: 
Not long years of study, not painstaking intellectual 
effort, but inner humility, openness, receptivity, the 
recognition of a common human need were the conditions 
of understanding this new language which the Holy 
Spirit taught.57 
A summary statement might be this one of Heineoken•s: "God 
53spac~ Age, p. 101. 
54Moment, p. 138. 
55rbid., p.· 68. 
56ibid., PP• 104-05. 
57Basic .Qbristiar. Teachings (Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg 
Presa, 1949), p. 107. 
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is not meant to be understood, but to be gbezad."58 
Heineoken speaks of the aotual historical character of 
God's revelation. "God reveals himself through actions and 
not through the ~bstraot thoughts of philosophers."59 This 
historical element is indeed part of the hiddenness of the 
revelation. This is the very offense to man's reason. 
It Cfor example, the incarnationl is the revelatory or 
salvatory event in which, quite paradoxically and in a 
hidden, non-discernible way as far as the senses or 
the insights of reason are concerned, the unseen God 
enters into space and time and effects man's redemption 
by imparting himself. Such salvatory events are in-
separable from historical events. They are "hidden" 
in them.60 
This, of course, is good Lutheran sacramental theology. 
Neither to be identified with the medium (except, of course, 
in the case of Christ) nor removed from the medium, God 
reveals Himself and comes through the historical, present, 
concrete medium. As Heinecken states it, "This God of love 
can be encountered at any time and at any place where~ 
61 &2_spel is E!:oclaimed and the sacraments§.!:!. administered." 
Ultimately Heinecken, like Brunner, explains Biblical 
epistemology by referring to the work of the Holy Spirit. 
"• •• any critic of the epistemology of the Christian 
58Moment, p. 128. 
59nasio Teachings, p. 29. 
60«Bultmann's Theology," -Sm• cit., P• ~90. 
61Moment, ·p. 116. 
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religion ought to be silenced by the tact of Pentecost," he 
says. 62 To the basic question "How does one know God?," 
Heinecken gives his answer and the answer of the Christian 
tradition as he says: 
that God is "known" only through the enlightenment ot 
the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the 
Son and whose coming is a part or the revelation of 
God in Christ, so that there is no revelation except 
as the sending of the6Spirit is included as a part of the revelatory event. 3 
The knowledge which the Spirit gives will be received in a 
different manner than the knowledge that "two times two is 
four or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon," says Heinecken. 
But t hose who have celebrated Pentecost will know, and they 
will know they know.64 
God reveals Himself as a personal being, says Heinecken, 
"a center of will and responsibility."65 He reveals His 
66 heart, His true disposition, "which is love," to men. Man 
is by nature "aware" or the "Other," but about His nature and 
disposition he knows nothing. 
His Cman'sl predicament is not his wrestling with 
the ouestion as to whether or not there is "a god," 
but ;ether to know the name, the true nature or 
62.Th!.!i•, p. 79. 
63tbid., pp. 77-78. 
64Ibid., p. 80. 
65Beeic tg1chings, P• 25. 
66Heinecken, Moment, p. 116. 
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that "unknown oneL" with whom he finds himself 
wrestling •••• 6'l 
Heinecken admits to a general revelation, a universal divine 
confrontation of man in his existence giving rise to an unde-
fined "existential awareness of the 'other, 1 ~ 68 but he says 
also that the gods of natural man "are one and all idols, 
who must be suppla~ted by the true God, .made 'known' only in 
Jesus Christ. 1169 The god arrived at by man's reasoning is 
never "the Creator upon whose will of love all that is 
depends absolutely" Rnd tttho One to whom he (man1 owes 
all.» 70 
God is not ther~ at the fringes of man's kno~ledge 
simply to explain what still remains inexplicable 
and mysterious, but the living God confronts man 
at all t i mes. • • • 71 
Heinecken is too much of an existentialist to deny any 
degree of awareness of the transcendent within man's natural 
inner experience. By an awareness of one's own limitations, 
by a sensitivity to the absolute claim laid upon man, by the 
feelings or insecurity and the threat of meaninglessnees, 72 
man "knows" or the "Other," but Heinecken would say, with 
67M. J. Hei.necken, "Man Today and the Message of 
Jus-l;ifica ti~n, n Lutheran World, IX (July, 1962), 197 • 
68 Moment, p •. 123. 
69Ibid.,. p. 77. 
70~., pp~ 126-27. 
7lspace Age, p. 73. 
72Ibid., pp. 108-10. 
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Brunner, that this knowledge is confused and idolatrous. 
The relation of reason to faith and theology 
This statement by Heinecken could just as well have 
been made by Brunner: 
While the formulation and acceptance of doctrine is 
not to be equated with the personal faith-relationship, 
it is most certainly inseparable from it •••• IWhile ~ 
the biblical record is not just a compendium of doc-
trines or truths but the witness to certain events, it 
is as such a witness replete with the doctrines which 
the transformed believers affirmed and which distinguished 
them from their pagan neighbora.73 __.,,.,. 
Just as God's revelation in His actions is always "inseparable 
from interpretive words, 1174 so man's affirmation of faith must 
be "in the form of sentences."~ In speaking of the necessity 
for anthropomorphisms in the Bible, Heinecken says that in 
order that man might know the living God, He had to reveal 
76 Himself "within the realm of what man can conceive." He 
had to submit Himself also to man's rational faculties, or 
f 
no communication would take place. 11 ••• because men 
believe in God they also believe certain things," says 
Heinecken.77 He insists, however, that these "things" about 
God are not to be confused with God Himself. "There 
73,hrist Frees and Unit!.§., PP• 47-48. -
7411Tension," ~· ill•, p. 202. 
75!bid., p. 203. 
76space Age, p. 87. 
77Basic Teachings, P• 18. 
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is a distinction between 'believing in' and 'believing that.• 
Only 'believing in' is faith. 'Believing that• accompanies 
the 'believing in.•n78 The assentia is a necessary but 
explicitly secondary corollary to the fiducia. One can have 
a "belief that" without a "belief in," but not vice versa. 
Heinecken does say that a specified list of doctrine is not 
necessary for faith: 
The acceptance of a doctrine or the atonement can save 
no one. Only actually being drawn i nto the right God-
relat i onship matters, and that can ha ppen even without 
the acceptance of some dootrine.79 
Although it is not clear what the "some" ot the above statement 
includes, it can be said that Heinecken would not agree to the 
possibility of faith with no objective knowledge whatsoever. 
Just what is the difference, then, which Heinecken sees 
between the knowledge of faith and analytic, objective 
knowledge? First of all, the former is found only within the 
existential relationship wh i le the latter is achieved in a 
detached, verifiable manner. 
By way of contrast with these tobjectivel propositions, 
the truth of which is determinable in spectator fashion 
either with apodictic certainty or with a degree of 
approximation only, there are "existential" proposi-
tions. These cannot be either affirmed or denied 
except by an "existing" individual who is involved 
in the entirety of his existence.SO 
78Ibid. 
79Ibid., P• 87. 
80Moment, p. 271. 
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One is built on the subject-object split; the other is based 
on a Subjeot-subjeot relationship. 
Man cannot know him CGodJ in the sense in which we 
know other thi ngs, when the idea in our mind (subjec-
tive) corresponds to some external refQrent (objec-
tive). Ve can know him only by being in the right 
relationship or trust and · obedience and love.Bl 
For the certainty or faith's knowledge there· can never 
be substituted "some kind of external guarantee.n82 In tact, 
as Heinecken says, 
the only way I can discern that I am confronted with 
the absolute miracle is if it does indeed conclusively 
confound~ understanding no matter how often I may 
say that the total view is in harmony with what some 
call '' the depth of reason." 8.3 
Even though a certain belief is contradictory for thought and, 
humanly speaking, quite impossible, yet the man of faith, 
on the basis or the personal confrontation with God, believes 
and asserts that it "is.«84 
Objective propositions and knowledge present the alter-
natives of faith or doubt, says Heinecken, while faith-directed, 
existential knowledge confronts a man with the decision ot 
faith or offense . "• •• in the former case the affirmation 
or denial makes no difference in the way I live; in the latter 
81 72. Ibid., p. 
82 239. Ibid., p. 
83 Ibid., PP• 346-47. 
84 51. Ibid., p. 
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a risk is involved.n8S In this faith-offense ultimatum 
presented by religious truth, one can sum up Heinecken's 
views with .regard to the nature and perception of religious 
truth: 
Those who are confronted with this presence of God in 
Jesus as the Christ do not face the e.lternative or 
belief or unbelief--as they would in relation to an 
ordinary historical event of which they are mere spec-
tators and which is established for them merely on the 
basis of probability and the accumulation of the 
weight of evidence. Rather they face the alternative 
of either "faith" or "offense"--surrendering in trust 
to the One who makes the absolute claim upon their 
lives, or "being offended" by the preposterousness of 
the claim. They cease from being mere spectators, 
because the demands of this One call for a decision 
e1ther of giving up one's autonomy and ,self-will in 
"faith" or retaining them in "offense.«86 
Thi~ option betwe·en autonomy on the one hand or surrender-
ing in obedience to the divine claim laid upon one's life on 
the other is precisely the option which Brunner sees confront-
ing man. Except for minor variations, therefore, it can be 
concluded, on the basis of the evidence presented in this 
section, that Heinecken and Brunner are in substantial 
agreement on the question of the nature and perception of 
religious truth. 
Taito Kantonen 
Neither Taito Kantonen nor Joseph Sittlor have as much 
to say in their published materials as does Martin Heineoken 
851.l?.!g,., p. 272. 
86tbid., P• 55. 
• 
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on the subject of this study. For this reason the treatment 
or both these men will be of a more cursory fashion than 
with Brunner and Heinecken. It will be shown, however, 
that both the men, and Kantonen in particular, agree to a 
great extent with Brunner on the question of religious truth 
and its perception. 
The historical perspective 
Kantonen's viewpoints on religious epistemology, like 
Brunner's and Heinecken's, can best be understood iti the 
light of the antithesis which he is opposing: the objective 
\ , 
rationalism of Protestant Orthodoxy. 
Luther, Kantonen argues, had opened up the dimension of 
the personal correspondence in the God-man relationship: 
He C Luther) stood 11 coram Deo, 11 in the presence of God 
never merely speculating or talking about Him but 
responding !.Q. Him with his whole being as person to 
person. Nor did he petrify God's Word into a system 
of abstract concepts. The Word was God himself speaking 
to him personally and reaching beyond his intellect into 
the innermost depths of his consoience.87 
But Orthodoxy, operating with the "static rationalism" ot 
traditional Protestant scholasticism, 88 soon removed this 
living God-man relationship from the realm of personal 
89 
experience into the realm of conceptual analysis. 
87Taito Almar Kantonen, Resurgence or 1h.!. Gospel 
(Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1948), P• 36. 
881J2.is.. , p. 13 7. 
89Ibid., P• 58 • 
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It was the misfortune of the Reformation that its 
great living truths received their systematic formu-
lation in an age when the basic thought-forms were 
supplied by a de~adent Aristotelian Soholasticism. 
Consequently the new wine ot the rediscovered Gospel 
was poured into the old wineskins of static intelleo-
tualism.90 
It might be made clear at this point that this writer is 
passing no judgment as to the strict aocuraoy of the above 
statement. Neither Brunner, Heinecken nor Kantonen go to 
any great length to supply primary evidence for their claims 
of Orthodoxy's so-called distortions of the epistemological 
relationship. It is more or less assumed that in Orthodoxy 
a rather sterile intellectualism did replace the more vibrant, 
existent i al approach of Luther. At any rate, it is this 
objectiviam, this emphasis upon the precisely defined and 
the rational, which Kantonen suggests as one of the chief 
obstacles blooki ng the way to a valid theological epistemo-_ 
logy. 
Greek versus Biblical concepts of knowledge 
"Truth is not decided by counting noses," says Kantonen. 91 
92 
It cannot be "pinned up and exhibited like dead butterflies." 
It is dynamic, and ita greatest foe is "static intellectual-
ism."93 Kantonen does not often refer to these objectivist 
901h!g_., P• 35. 
91Taito Almer Kantonen, Lit§. attar Death (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1962), p. 21. 
92T. A. Kantonen, Ila. Theo1qgY 52.t Eyanee1ism (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1954), P• 20. 
93Kantonen, R§aureenoe, P• 33. 
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tendencies as being specifically "Greek," but it is clear that 
the entire tradition of philosophical, speculative analysis 
and reflection is being suggested. 
The difference betveen this tradition and the Christian 
or Biblical one is the difference between contemplation and 
narration. 
Christianity is not just another theory of knowledge, 
another attempt to discover truth. It never stops 
with mystical feeling or philosophical reflection, 
in which a man lndulges for his own satisfaction. 
It is essentially not contemplation at all, although 
contemplation may be used to clarify it, but narration, 
an account of what God has done and is doing and what 
happens to us when God does His work in us.94 
Kantonen is possibly more involved in the practical 
mission of the Church than either Brunner or Heinecken. A 
number of the books he has written deal with practical subjects 
such as stewardship and evangelism. Consequently, he often 
carries the discussion of the difference betveen Greek and 
Biblical thought into the applied situation within the life 
of the Church. He says, "Vital theology, then, like vital 
preaching, is never a mere juxtaposition of propositions, 
no matter how important or trua."95 With refe r ence to 
preaching once more, he writes: 
When the Gospel is preached in its original purity 
and vigor as the wisdom of God and the power of God, 
not as a philosophy of some sort, it continues to 
bristle with paradoxes.96 
Or, regarding educational principles in the Church's mission, 
94Kantonen, Theology 2f Evangelism, p. 10. 
95Reaurgenae, p. 100. 
96The Message of the Church 1Q. !h.! World of Today 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 194lf;° P• 61. 
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Kantonen observes: 
Religious life will continue to be at a low ebb in our 
congregations so long as we operate simply on the assump-
tion that vital religion can be taught without stressing 
that it has to be caught. It is a fallacious idea, 
drawn from Greek philosophy, not from the Christian 
Gospel, that oorrect knowledge will automatically 
result in right action.97 
Paradox, dynamic vitality, involvement--these character= 
istica of Biblical thought are thus contrasted with the empha-
sis upon propositions, rationality and systematic cateohiza-
tion in the more objective Greek tradition. Unlike the abstract 
speculative nature of Greek thought, Biblical thought is con-
crete and personal, says Kantonen. "This fact Cthe incarnation1 
give the Christian kerygma at the same time a living per-
sonal concreteness which distinguishes it from every form 
or speculation •••• n9S The Church's message does not 
consist of abstract principles, but of the specific and 
concrete mighty acts of God in history and experience,99 
"The burden of the apostolic witness was not 'God wrote a book' 
but 'God sent forth his Son.•nlOO Kantonen, then, along with 
Brunner and Heinecken, but not in as detailed a manner, would 
claim a radical difference between the knowledge and import 
97Resurgenge, pp. 218-19. 
98T. A. Kant onen, "Chriet--the Hope of Those Who are 
Outside the Church," Lutheran World, I (Summer, 1954), 114. 
99Kanton~n, · J:Se ssage, P• 30. 
lOOKantonen, Rgsurgence, P• 107. 
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of philosophical, purely rational activity and the knowledge 
end import of the Biblical tradition. Once more, the differ-
ence might be aptly summarized as that existing between kennen 
and wiesen as epistemological relationships. 
· The subject-object split and beyond 
It need only be noted here that Kantonen does not use 
the "subject-object" category to develop his position. 
Personalism as the key 
Kantonen, like Brunner and Heinecken, finds in the 
personality construction the key to Biblical truth and its 
perception. 
the central doctrine of Christianity is personality-
construotion. That doctrine--and it is . inseparably 
connected with the person of Jeaus--is the doctrine 
of the Kingdom of God •••• When ve try to express 
the Kingdom in terms of an~thing static, ve get into 
paradoxes; the solut~on or these paradoxes lies in 
the living, growing, dynamic reality known as person-
ality.101 
Whether the personality-structure "solves" the paradoxes 
of Biblical truth . or whether it rather displays them for 
what they really are--unfathomable mysteries in another 
dimension from that of the fact and the thing--is a question 
Kantonen would probably answer in favor or the latter alter-
native. But it is evident· that h.e, too, sees a direct 
analogy between personality and Biblical truth. The 
lOlKantonen, Message, PP• 112-lJ. 
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knowledge of God and His wars is much the same as knowledge 
of another person. "It is a matter of the will," says 
K ~2 antonen, "that is, of the whole personality." 
Once again, with Kantonen, as with Brunner and Heinecken, 
the personality-structure 1a not arbitrarily picked out as the 
most apt analogy of knowledge of the Divine. The most con- . 
vincing reason for its use is the person of Christ. "Unlike 
any religion or philosophy, Christianity is inseparably bound 
up with the person of its Founder."l03 The living Christ is 
the basic determinant of the personal nature of Biblical truth. 
"It (faith] is a person-to-person relation with C~rist, which 
dissolves into nothingness unless it is vitalized by recurrent 
encounters with its living object."l04 
Kantonen most often sets forth this personalistic scheme 
of Biblical truth in direct contrast and, this writer holds, 
in revction to a more intellectualistic, objectivistio struc-
ture. Some examples are listed: 
The God of the Bible does not concern himself with 
imparting to m~n a body of facts, and principles 
for interpreting them6 but with establishing personal fellowship with men.l 5 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
l02TheologY tl Evangelism, P• 8. 
103Message, p. 52. 
l04Resurgence, p. 81. 
l05Theologi 21. Evgngei'ism, P• 18. 
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The God who became man is not concerned with truths 
or principles but with persons •••• His appeal 
therefore does not take the form "Believe my teachings," 
"Follow my precepts," but "Believe in me," "Follow me," 
"lam the truth.nlOo 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
In the person-to-person encounter of faith the believer 
takes hold of the Lord himself, not just something said 
or written about Him.107 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
In the Christian message it is not an institution or 
a book or a body of doctrine that asks for our trust 
and obedience but a person who says, 11 I am the truth. 
• • • 11108 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~Jaeusl came not to win assent to a set of proposi-
tions but to seek and to eave men.109 
The note of reaction is clear; Kantonen is not only presenting 
theological parsonalism as the key to understanding the Christian 
faith, but is, in so doing, opposing a concurrent theological 
thought-system which he feels is misleading and ultimately 
false. 
Kantonen claims that an appreciation of this personality 
construction is first truly realized in a vital awareness of 
sin. "A man becomes aware of God as a person only when he 
l06 11 christ--the Hope," ~· ill•, P• 114. 
l07aesurgenoe, PP• 109-10. 
108A Theology !2.!'. Christian §tevardshiR (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1956); PP• 12-13. 
l09Theology .Q.f Evangelism, P• 19. 
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has become aware that his will has orossed God's will."llO 
Only when man's secret sins have been exposed and his vain 
pretensions shattered, can a personal relationship with God 
' become possible, says Kantonen, 111 This possibility of 
relationship becomes a reality in the forgiveness or sins. 
·"A vital personal relationship between man and God thus 
comes into existence, but its sole ground and constant pivot 
i 112 a the forgiveness of sins." 
I 
Kantonen thus bases hie 
peraonaliatic viewpolnt on the thoroughly Lutheran eub-
struotur~ of sin and grace. 
God as Revealer 
"Christian truth, the truth or the gospel, is, · first ot 
all, li'lfealad truth. It :ls baaed on divine self-disclosure. 11113 
Kantonen, ·too, insists that man's knowledge of God finds its 
source and content in God's self-communication. God is 
Subject of the epistemological relationship. "• •• man 
cannot find God until God has found him,n114 "God himself 
must precede our idea or God. 1111 5 'When speaking of such 
llOBesurgence, P• 7). 
lll4heology f9r Chri§tian ~tewardshlp, P• 29. 
112Resurgence, P• 74. 
ll3Kantonen, Theology g.!: Evangelism, P• 7. 
114Resurgence, p. 97. 
115Theolog1 ~ Evangelism, P• 7. 
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divine secrets as the nature of life after death, man's own 
surmises and arguments have no part, says Kantonen. "It 
Cthe answer to such a questionl is drawn entirely from God's 
revelation of himself •••• »ll6 Revelation is the basis 
of Biblical epistemology. 
But this revelation is something much more then a body 
of correct propositions or flawless words, Kantonen insists. 
The Word is not only the revealer of divine wisdom 
but also and primarily tho vehicle of divine power, -
the power to give vital conviction, to break sinful 
habit, to redirect the will, to bridge the chasm be-
tween God and man.117 
Kantonen emphasizes the "power" inherent in God's aelf-
discloeure. G-0d's revelation is so much more than truths 
to be accepted; it is acting, saving, power-transmitting 
truth. 
But Christian truth is not only revealed truth, in 
which God himself assumes the initiative. It is also 
redemptive truth, which shows God to be in saving 
action • . It is ~ot a mere communicatio~ of ideas but 
a transmission of power. Revelation is inseparable 
from salvation.118 
Only when the Word of God is received as a personal address-
to the individual does this power-instilling communication 
ta~e place. As long as it is received as information about 
God or as oodifiable material for doctrines it is powerless 
and incomplete. Kantonen gives a forceful picture of the 
116Life after Death, P• 2. 
117Resurgenoe, P• 143. 
118Theology £! Evangelism, P• 8. 
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living Word and its transforming workings, as opposed to 
a lifeless word considered as objective fact, in the follow-
ing quotation: 
The Word is not a collection or ideas to be understood 
or a set of rules to be obeyed but the power of a new 
life to be received. Its primary appeal is neither to 
the intellect nor to the emotions but to the will and 
conscience, to man as man. It seeks to take hold of 
the total personality and to give not mere information 
about God but fellowship with God. It is not a general 
"to whom it may concern" but addresses itself, to use 
a good Quaker expression, "to our condition.nJ It meets, 
not men's idle curiosity, but their anxiety, guilt, 
despair. It confronts men at the point of their deepest 
need. It both discloses and meets our need for a Savior. 
It brings to us not only new insight and wisdom on matters 
vhich constitute our ultimate concern but an entirely 
nev structure of life, the rule of God, the sovereignty 
of Christ. ~t not only acquaints us with the sacred 
Scriptures but transforms us into living epistles of 
Christ.119 
The antithesis against which Kantonen is reacting with this --= 
dynamic, personal approach to the Word is obvious: the 
biblicistic tendency to over-objectivize and depersonalize 
into cold abstractions the living voice of God. 
the divine truth does not endure as a static quantum, 
possessed ·and hoarded and handed down from one genera-
tion to another, but as a series of personal encounters 
by which men of each successive generation face God 
himself~ hear Hie voice and receive His life-changing _ 
power.l~O 
Kantonen explains that this always contemporaneous 
encounter is made effective only through the Spirit of God 
119 6 Theoloey ~ Christian atewardship, PP• 15-l. 
120 
Kantonen, Resurgence, P• 126. 
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who alone makes known the true significance or the Word. 1 21 
Furthermore, Kantonen, together with Heinecken, adds the 
Lutheran note that God can be known perhaps most explicitly 
in the saoraments. 122 
The relation of reason to faith and theology 
Kantonen calls "Lutheran"--and thus agrees with--
Brunner•s position thet man's spiritual nature, even in its 
sin-perverted state, still affords a point of contact with 
God.«123 Whether Kantonen would have Brunner include the 
• reason in "man's spiritual nature" is uncertain. K~ntonen 
does say this, however, about unregenerate reason: "Natural 
unregenerate reason not only fails to find God; it also fails 
to see in the Gospel anyth3ng but foolish nonsense."124 At 
another place he expands upon this thought: 
Human reason can give us an Aristotelian God who sits 
in solitary splendor contemplating his own perfection 
and refusing to contaminate himself with the imperfec-
tions of the world. It cannot give us a God who runs 
down the road to embrace one whose associations hsve 
been with harlots and swine.125 
121 
lill•' p. 124. 
122lh!g,., p. 109. 
123 .Ill£., P• 16. 
124Ibid., pp. 106-07. 
125 Theology .21: Christian §tewardghip, p. 39. 
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Rationalistic theology applies only "high and glorious" 
terms to God, says Kantonen, vhereas faith's theology g'raspa 
God even in His masks of weakness, disgrace and suffering. 126 
No mere theological analysis will enable man to appreciate 
the true meaning or, for example, justification by faith; it 
is only when one embarks "on the same venture of personal 
faithn127 that it is truly realized and experienced. 
Kantonen does not speak explicitly about the necessity 
of reason in either the faith-relationship or in the task 
of theology. His main interest seems to lie in demonstrating 
the inadequacy of the reason to independently achieve a vital 
relationship with God. Man, in his perennial state of un-
villingness to "acknowledge his dependence, to accept his 
finiteness, to admit his insecurity,"128 seeks a man-made 
way of salvation, to be brought about according t~ the self-
sufficient dictates of reason. Kantonen calls this autono-
mous attempt of man naive and impossible. 
If our difficulty were only a lack of knovledge or a 
weakness of the moral will, we would need only a 
teacher or an exemplar. But sin is such a radical 
dislocation of our basic relation to God that we need 
a Mediator and a Savior.129 
126 
Resurgence, p. 125. 
127 
Ibid., P• 74. 
128 
Ibid:•, p .. 27. 
129 
Message, pp. 54-55. 
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The discussion of Kantonen closes at this point, with 
the acknowledgment that his treatment of the epistemological 
question is perhaps the most purely theological of the men 
studied so far, at least from the Lutheran standpoint. His 
constant attention to such strictly theological issues as 
sin and justification and his avoidance of such constructs 
as "subject" and nobjectn in connection with the question 
or the perception or Biblical truth set him somewhat apart 
from the other two. It has been sufficiently noted, however, 
that he is in substantial agreement with them in every impor-
tant emphasis regarding the question of theological epistemol-
ogy. 
Joseph Sittler 
Of the three Lutheran theologians being considered, 
Joseph Sittler stands out fpr a number of reasons. His 
thought is possibly the most original of ·the three and the 
most poignantly phrased. While Heinecken concerns himself 
primarily with the existentialist approach and Kantonen 
with the purely Lutheran theological approach, Sittler's 
main interest lies in the area of ecumenics and a contempo-
rary restatement of the Christian faith. Sittler has the 
least to say on the subject of this study. It oan be seen, 
however, that what he does say agrees quite closely with the 
thought of the other three men above. This section will 
attempt to point out these areas or basic agreement. 
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The historical perspective 
Sittler, like the others, sees the period ot Orthodoxi 
as the stultification of the dynamic, relational theology 
or the Reformers. Orthodoxy's central tragedy, according 
to Sittler, was that it "stultified the Reformer's doctrine 
of the Word in definitions aimed at intellectual 
acceptance. . . . 11130 Understanding revelation in a 
"propositional, documentary, static, and thoroughly 
intellectualized manner,"lJl Orthodoxy attempted, as had 
medieval theology before it,132 to give man religious 
certainty. But in its search for certainty and safeguards, 
it somehow lost track of the core of what it was trying to 
protect. 
Seeking to enclose the living, orthodoxy stifled. 
Seeking to cherish by logically necessary formula-
tions, it squeezed out of the doctrine the decision 
of faith. Seeking to tighten theologically, it 
reduced religiously. Seeking to protect a heritage 
by enclosing it in a box--it mummified.133 -
Whenever the living, personal truth is thus conceived of in 
terms of right teaching,· an explosive reaction is bound to 
follov, argues Sittler~ He points at Pietism aa the 
lJOThe Doctrine~ Xhe Word (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg 
Press,· 1948), p. 44. 
1311h!.!!•, P• 48. 
l32.Il2isl., P• 13. 
1
~
3
.IJu.s.., P• 49. 
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"explosion" which followed Orthodoxy. 
when the object of faith has been theologically 
transmuted into a static identification with a 
historic~! document, then. faith, which is always 
dynamic, will inevitably shift its attention to an 
area in which a dynamic need can be met by a dynamic 
object. In this inst~noe CPietismJ, to the 
believing individua1.iJ4 
The dynamic or the authentic God-man relationship, once 
released, "cannot permit theology ever again to operate 
as if it had not been," says Sittler. 135 The Church always 
must and will be on guard against the objeetivization of the 
address of the gospel. 
Greek versus Biblical concepts of knowledge 
"The gospel is not a holy box of divine propositions-
ranging from simple to complex; it is nothing less than the 
organic life of God confronting us nov here, now there.n136 
With this differentiation between the proposition and the 
living, confronting voice of God Sittler sets up the radioal 
dichotomy of Greek versus Biblical thought ~ On the surface, 
Biblical truth may appear not dissimilar to philosophic truth; 
134Ibid., pp. 45-46. (It is this writer's conviction 
that this is the precise occasion of each of these four 
men's emphasis on the personal, the relational and the non-
propositional; they, too, are reacting, in an almost in-
evitable direction, against an objectivism and intellectual-
ism within the Church of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.) 
13511A Christology of Function," lli Lutheran Quarterly, 
VI (1954), 124. 
136Joaeph Sittler, Ill!. Ecology .Q.! Faith (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1961), p. 65. 
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but underneath, the two reveal a radically diverse framework 
of meaning. Objective truth can be spoken of in one-level, 
undialectical statements; Biblical truth is or necessity 
"multipl~-level" in meaning and dialectical. 
For the central revelation of God in an Incarnation 
of grace in a world of nature inwardly requires that 
all discourse inclusive of these two magnitudes is 
of necessity dialeotical.137 
Sittler thus holds that every simple term of faith must be 
set forth in such a way that the multiple dimensions of its 
own content are exposed. Thie interpenetration of the Divine 
and the human, of sin and grace, of the old end the new 
within religious truth makes for a unique epistemology, an 
epistemology which seeks the truo and expresses itself within 
the framework of the dialectical. 
Sittler emphasizes the fact that the modern age calls 
for an epistemology and an apologetic far different from 
those of the classical period. He writes: 
It may well be that we are entering upon a period in 
the church's life wherein men's minds must be shocked 
open to entertain the suspicion that there are realms 
of meaning, promise, e.nd judgment vhich ensconce God's 
incarnated action for their vague disquietudes.138 
Speaking of God in terms or substance and ideal essence is 
impossible for contemporary man, says Sittler. "The problem 
ot the knowledge of God must, with us, operate with the 
137 Ibid., p. 47. 
l.38"The Shape of the C.burch 's Response in Worship,~ 
The Ecumenical Review, X (January, 1958), 146. 
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realities of energy, realizing vill, purposive intention.n1 39 
Today man speaks in terms of force and function and not in 
terms of objective substance. · . 
formulations enunciated in one age are deepeningly 
unintelligible in another. The terms of discourse 
evoked by and addressed to one historical situation 
are no longer deelarative of what they sought to say--
a grammar of substance is alien to a gram.mar of func-
tion--and are therefore, for the contemporary church, 
neither adequate confession nor meaningful piety.140 
Sittler sums up the contrast between classical Greek-
informed concepts or truth and knowledge and the concepts 
operative among contemporary (and among the Biblical writers 
and the Reformers as well, he would say) men in this pene-
trating statement: 
the classical Christolcgy of the Greeks perpetuates 
formulations whioh operate with a way of speaking 
about God vhich is incongruent with our time end its 
ways of thinking. 
Cla ssical terms were expressive of bodies; ours must 
be expressive of functions. Nieaea operated with the 
discourse of statics; co~te mporary discourse is per-
meated through and through vith a world view which 
is dynamic. For us, persons are not bodies, but units 
or force and will; all things are not bodies, but aims, 
means, and creations of these units. The classical 
relationshin betYeen bodies was positional; our under-
standing of.relationship is funotiona1.141 
Sittler thus adds this important concept or "functionalism" 
to the list of differences between the Greek ~nd the Biblical 
concepts of truth. The difference is . once more seen to be 
13911A Christology," .Qla• ill•, P• 127. 
140Ibid., p. 131. 
141~., pp, 122-23. 
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one of kind and of dimension or meaning, rather than one of 
gradation within a singular framework of truth. 
The subjact-objeot split and beyond 
The paucity of Sittler's remarks with regard to the 
inadequacy of the subjeot-objaot process in acquiring knowledge 
about God tloes not diminish the impact of his thought in this 
area. Subjeot-objeot epistemology must give way to faith's 
own way of knowing whon it comes to Biblical truth, 
This ttoommon oentaru and ttglowing core" of Luther's 
theology ••• is faith as an independent fbrm of the 
apprehension, reception, and actualization of the life 
of God. Whenever theology is informed by faith as its 
constituent principle an unmistakable dynamism pervades 
its every part and method. This is so because when 
God is known · by faith, that very way of knoving bestows 
a n immediacy of relationship not communicable in subject-
object ways of knowladge.142 
Sittler capsules wha.t the other three men under discussion 
had been saying, as he says, 
What is given in faith is not knowledge about God but 
God himself as life, grace, love, and forgiveness- The 
vary totality-character of the act of fnith transce~ds 
every epistemological analogy whereby a systemization 
of it may ba attempted. Faith is an independent form 
of God-relationship, and its energies cannot be contained 
within categories which would deal with God as an object 
of knowledge. For it is the first thing I know about 
God when I know hjm in faith that I hed not known him 
at all had he not in aggressive love known me into 
knowledge of himsalr.14J. 
ll~2noctrine .2! the Word, PP• 5-6. 
143 Ibid., p. 6. 
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This writer would be ha.rd put to find a more apt summary ot 
the entire epistemological thrust of the four men being 
considered than these two exo~rpts from Joseph Sittler. 
Personalism es the key 
Here also, what little Sittler hes to say specifically 
about the peraonaliatic nature of revelation and divine 
truth shows that he is in agreement with Brunner and his 
two fellow Lutherans. 
Revelation is not a thing--but an action of God, a~ 
event involving two parties; it is a personal address. 
There is no such thjng as revelation-in-itself, 
because revelation consists of the fact that something 
is revealed to !!llt.144 
S1ttler seems to favor the term "dynamic" over "personal" 
to convey his concept of a living, relational structure of 
Biblical truth and knowledge. He uses the term "personal" 
rarely, perhaps to avoid the pitfalls of secular pereonalism. 
It is admitted that the connotations of "dynam1o" and 
"pers6nal" are quite diverse. However, from such statements 
as above,145 it is clear that his intention is not to contra-
dict but to rephrase the personalistio oonstruots of the other 
three. 
God as Revealer 
144J;bid., p. 33. 
l45See also: Sittler•s Doctrine 2.1: ~ Word, P• 48. 
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Revelation is seen as dynamic and existential divine 
self-disclosure by Sittler. 
Lutheran theology, with its understanding of 
revelation as the Deus Loguens can never equate the 
revelat i on with a book, a palpable historical produqt. 
Revela t ion ie, rather, the address or God to man, the 
incessant self-disclosure of God in his vill and mercy, 
in his judgment and appeal. Revelation is not a thing; 
it is a continuing activity. It is not static but 
dynamic.146 
God can be known only because and i~ so far as he reveals 
Himselr, 147 and, in order that he might truly be known by man, 
he must "present himself to man as a God for sinners.n148 
Gqd and His gospel are first realized in a genuine sense 
when man responds to God's call to undeserved fellowship. 
Sittler, like both the other Lutherans, insists that 
God's self-disclosure is always veiled and open only to the 
response of faith. 
For, while God wills to reveal himself, he always 
reveals himself in a veiled way, in such a relationship 
to the things of earth that man must ask after h i m in 
desperate earnestness •••• It is ultimately of the 
mercy of God that he reveals h i mself to me in such a 
way that only in faith I may know him.149 
God reveals Himself in such veiled ways as, for example, the 
cross, argues Sittler, "· •• that through faith he may really 
reveal himself, and not merely some information about him-
l46Doctrine 21, the Word, P• ll. 
147lh!s,., P• 17. 
148Ibii•, p. 7. 
l49Ib1d., PP• 63-64. 
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self. 11150 The masks of revelations, those indirect means 
whioh defy rational apprehension, are t~us part and parcel 
of the God-man epistemological relationship. God comes, 
not in idea , but in cloaked fact. He can be known, not by 
ordinary rational endeavor, but only in the response of 
faith. Sittler adds this thought: 
When God makes the requirement that who would know 
him must know him in faith, he but requires, in the 
area of religious knowledge, what is necessary in 
accordance with his nature as Agape. That is to 
say that the revelation of God, interpreted in terms 
of Eros, may be so received as to require no such 
radical faith. But God as Agape stands over against 
me in so sharp a discontinuity that a lesser personal 
coalescence of the whole being than faith as trust is 
improper to the nature of the revelation.!'~!' 
God's revelation is unique and the reception of this revela-
tion is unique because God as Agape is unique. Brunner might 
have phrased this same thought: God's revelation is personal 
and its reception is personal because God is personal~ 
The relation 0£ reason to faith and theology 
Sittler provides no excursus on this specific subject. 
He does say, however, that clarity of doctrine "without the 
love of the brother who is luminously before us precisely 
152 
as the brother is the clarity of damnation." He would thus 
150.I]u.g,., p. 66. 
151Ibid., P• 64. 
152ucalled to Unity," The Eoumenioa,l Review, XIV 
(January, 1962), 185. 
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second Brunner•s frequent observation that doctrine tor 
doctrine's sake breeds lovelessness.153 Doctrines are 
indeed necessary, aaya Sittler, to meet the exigent challenges 
of definite historical threats,154 but the moment these doc-
trines become the object rather than the expression of faith, 
they have ceased to serve their function and have become a 
decided distortion of the dynamic, faith-engendered and sus-
tained God-man relationship. 
With these remarks Chapter II comes to a close. The 
evidence supplied in this section is sufficient to support 
a olaitn that Martin Heineoken, Taito Kantonen and Joseph 
Sittler, although varying on several matters of emphasis 
and adding several specifically Lutheran notes to the dis-
cussion, substantially agree with the epistemological posi-
tion of Emil Brunner presented in Chapter I. 
153 Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, translated 
by Amandus w. Loos (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1943), p. 103. 
154ucalled to Unity," .2J2.• cit., P• 185. 
CHAPTER III 
CONCLUSION 
The six fooi oround which Emil Brunner structures his 
theological epistemology have, by this time, been oft repeated. 
A. His position can best be understood by investigating 
the historical perspective and noting that he is consciously 
and intentionally countering what he calls a false objecti-
vism within P~otestant Orthodoxy. 
B. The fallacy of so much of the Orthodox approach is 
that it f ollows Greek rather than Biblical thought-patterns, 
says Brunner. The Greek tradition's approach to truth empha-
sizes the abstract, the timeless and universal, the objective, 
the fact and the syetematizable; the Biblical approach, on 
the other hand, emphasizes the concrete, the historical and 
the existential, the personal, the act and the paradoxical. 
The key to the Greek pattern is rationality; the key to the 
Biblical is personal faith in response to a personal encounter. 
c. Inherent in the Greek epistemology is the subject-
object way of knowing. Brunner insists that this process is 
untrue to Biblical truth, and that only a Subjeot-subject 
pattern renders genuine knowledge of God and the God-man 
relationship. 
D. The key to theological epistemology is the personal-
istic framework of knowing. A man knows God as he knows 
another person. All of the abiding mysteries of personality, 
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all the relatedness and intimacy of communion, all the non-
objectifiable qualities existing within the close person-to-
person relationship, all of the knowledge gained only through 
trust and aharing--these enigmatical elements which make up 
the epistemological relation between one person and another 
hold true in man's epistemological relationship with God who 
is personal and who bea_ame a Person in history for man. 
E. God is evermore Subject of this personal epistemolo-
gical relationship. By ·ais historical and existential reve-
lation and by it alone can man oome to know God. The Bible 
is the means to this self-disclosure. 
F. Human reason, while essential in both the activity 
of faith and in theologizing, remains ancillary and subservi-
ent to faith's own way of knowing. The knowledge of faith 
(kennen) and the knowledge of reason (wissen) operate in two 
different dimensions of truth. While there are necessarily 
objective elements to be knowr- in the God-man epistemological 
relationship, yet these objective facts merely inform the 
really primary activity: the trusting and obedient response 
or faith to the address of the self-disclosing God. 
While several differences in emphasis are noticeable 
and while the distinctively Lutheran approach shows up in di-
verse ways and places in thei~ positions, yet it has been 
shown by considerable documentatio.n that the three American 
Lutheran theo~ogians, Martin Heineoken, Taito Kantonen and 
Joseph Sittler, ar~ in substantial agreement with Brunner in 
every one of the six categories listed above. ~here is little 
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obvious dependency upon Brunner,1 but the similarities in 
viewpoint do exist, whether derived from Brunner, or from a 
possible common souroe such es Soren Kierkegaard or Martin 
Buber, or from independent or semi-independent study and 
discovery. These four men are opposing the same antitheses 
and are proposing muoh the same answer to the God-man epistemo-
logical question. 
Whlle the stated purpose of this study is to "present" 
Brunner's theological epistemology and that of the three 
Lutherans in comparison to it, and not to evaluate or criti-
cize it, still it mi ght be helpful to include at this point 
some of the more telling of the criticisms contemporary 
theologians are leveling against Brunner's position. 
A. Schrader olaima that Brunner is guilty of both · "bad 
theology and bad metaphysics" in his insistence that God is 
pure subject. 
But when Brunner claims that a subject can never be 
known as an object, he is, I think, guilty of a conf'u-
sion. It does not follow from the fact that a subject 
cannot gua subject be known as objeot, that a subject 
cannot be known as an object. Only if a being were 
nure subject would this inference be justified. In 
the case of God, of course, this is precisely what 
Brunner and others have maintained. And Brunner makes 
a similar claim with respect to human subjects • 
• • • The fact is that I am both subject and object 
and the unity of the two. I can be known objectively 
1 There are a few direct references to his writings, 
however, and several sufficiently acknowledged appropria-
tions of identical terminology. See Martin J. Heineoken, 
The Moment Before God (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 
1956), p. 240. ----
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even though my inwardness can be revealed only insofar 
as I choose to reveal it through communication. It 
would be, I think, just as wrong to be treated as a 
pure subject as am.QI.!. objeot.2 
Brunner would probably answer this, as is shown in the section 
entitled "Relation ot Reason to Faith and Theology,"3 that 
there are indeed objective, rational elements in man's know-
ledge of God. But to place the primary emphasis upon God as 
object in the epistemological relationship is to miss the 
really valid way of knowing Him. 
B. With regard to Brunner's personalistic emphasis, 
Paul Jewett maintains that Brunner's claim to personal 
correspondence as the basic thought-form of the Bible 
"cannot be sustained.»4 William Wolf, too, puts the 
question as to whether Brunner is not "subjecting the bibli-
cal material to a large amount of a priori personalistic 
metaphysic.» 5 Paul Tillich says that this personalistic 
category is not exclusive enough to really be contributing 
significant information about the Divine-human encounter. 
He writes: 
2aeorge A. Schrader, 11Brunner's Conception of Philo-
sophy," in Ill Theolog;y .Q..! !mil Brunner, edited by Charles W. 
Kegley (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), PP• 123-24. 
3supra, pp. 56ff. 
4"Ebneria~ Personaliam end its Influence upon Brunner's 
Theology," !h§_ Westminster Theological Journal, XIV (May, 
1952), · 147. 
5"An Outline of Brunnar's Theology," Anglioan 
Theological Review, XXX (April, 1948), 132. 
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Life in all its dimensions cannot be grasped without 
an encounter of the knowing and the known beyond the 
subject-object scheme, If this is the case, the 
questi on may arise whether the person-to-person 
encounter is the only valid analogy to the Divine-
human encounter and whether, therefore, in the 
description of the way of knowing God, the per3on-
a listio categories s hould be used exclusively,6 
Robert Bertram claims that if non-theological science would 
ever succeed in cleari ng up some of the difficulties of 
interpersona l knowledge, this would, according to Brunner's 
approach, endanger or at least lessen God's transcendence. 
He [Brunner] has fixed upon the general epistemological 
dist i ncti on between personal and non-personal knowledge; 
and noting the technical difficulties which philosophy 
has had in accounting for the former, he ooncludea that 
th i s philosophically inexplicable knowledge of persons 
is peculiar to divi ne revelation and is the proper 
subject matter of Christian theology and ethics. And 
from this he has gone on to say, in effect, t hat the 
transcendent God is transcendent, at least partly, 
because He is a person. (This is certainly different 
from saying that God transcends our knowledge some-
what like persons do,)? 
I 
Thia writer would be interested in hearing Brunner's reply 
to this charge that he has started with a general personal-
' istic epistemology and then foisted it upon Christian theology. 
Concerning the last two sentences of Bertram's charge, Brunner 
would no doubt say that he does both: he sees God as personal 
or as a Person (s pecifically in Jesus Christ) and he knows 
6 
"Some Questions on Brunner's Epistemology," in!!'!.! 
Theology of !mil Brunner, edited by Charles W, Kegley (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 100, 
7 . 
"Brunner on Revelation," Concordia Theological 
Monthly, XXII (September, 1951), 639° 
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God in a way similar to the way he knows a person. Both sides 
are true to his position. 
C. Schrotenboer 1 s final evaluation of Brunner's posi-
tion reads: 
He CBrunner) does not stand apart from the stream ot 
modern thought, calling it back to the fountain-head 
of truth, namely, the God of the Bibl~, but he is 
himself influenced strongly by the Zeitgeist. This 
is apparent from bis uncritical acceptance of higher 
criticism, his irrationalistic devaluation of theory, 
and his construction of the truth of revelation as 
personal correspondence.a 
Brunner admits to an acceptance of higher critioism,9 but 
perhaps not uncritically; he does devaluate theory, but not 
irrationally; 10 he does see Biblical truth as personal 
correspondence. 11 Does this necessarily determine that he 
is leading avay from the "fountain-head of truth" or that 
he is in error holding these positions? 
Jewett criticizes Brunner for inadequate Scriptural 
proof for his various viewpoints. For example, he complains 
that Brunner cites only two passages12 to support his major 
8 P. G. Schrotenboer, A New Apologetics: !.!l !!:!!.lzsis 
~ Appraisal of 1h..! Eristic Theology Q.! Emil Brunner (Kampen: 
J . H. Kok, 1955), p. 216. 
9 Supra, p. 49. 
lOEmil Brunner, Revelation and Reason; !h.!t Christian 
Doctrine of Faith !U!.!! Knowledge, translated by Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c~ 1946), p. 418. 
11 
supra, p. 40. 
121 Cor. 8:1-3 and Eph. 1:4. 
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thesis of personal correspondence as ·~he fundamental category 
of Biblical truth. 13 This writer woul d have to agree that 
Brunner 1 s use of Scripture is sketchy, to aay the least, in 
most of his writings. By what standards one is to judge 
adequate Scriptural substantiation for a certain viewpoint 
is another question, however. 
D. Schrotenboer furthermore claims that Brunner places 
too much stock in human reason. 
Brunner requires a subordination of ~eason, but no 
reformation of reason. According to his presentation, 
reason as t he power of ideation spells autonomy for 
man. Such autonomy is not wrong in itself, but becomes 
sin 011ly ·when it oversteps its bound'.s.14 
Brunner only s peaks of the reason as »autonomous" aa it sets 
itself up a s an absolute authority over against God, how-
ever.15 Autonomous r eason is always sin to Brunner. Would 
not Lutherans agree with him that reason is indeed capable in 
the things below and that it errs only when it oversteps its 
earthly bounds and attempts to plumb the things above? 
Some of the oritioisma against Brunner•s epistemology 
are justifiable; others are of questionable weight. This 
writer would add only two questions to the general discussion 
concerning Brunner 1 s position: 
Is he correct, partially correct or incorrect in his 
1 3 Jewett, "Ebnerian Pei•sonalism, 11 .2.E• cit., P• 134. 
15Brunner, Revelation and Reason, P• 208. 
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disparagement of the presuppositions; methods and conclusions 
of Orthodoxy? If his charges of a distorted theology coming 
from this period are valid, doee the fault lie with Orthodoxy 
itself, or principally with those two centuries between the 
period of Orthodoxy and today? At any rate, if his accusa-
tions of a false and misleading objectivity and a static 
intellectualism leading toward an invalid theological epis-
temology within Orthodoxy are correct or partially correct, 
then it must be remembered, vith all that this implies, 
that Lutheran Orthodoxy and its twentieth century descendants 
are included in this accusation. 
What part, if any, of Brunner•a theological epistemol-
ogy can be accepted by the Lutheran theologian? Heinecken, 
Kantonen and Sittler agree with most of his major emphases 
in this area. Is the proper stance over against Brunner's 
peraonalistic position a judicious and balanced incorporation 
of his perceptive contribution to the discussion of the 
nature and perception of Biblical truth into a theology 
already well-founded, by God's grace, in the objective 
truths of the Christian faith? 
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